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A Prolegomenon on Moderation in Plato's *Republic*

by

Stephen John Lange



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

Edmonton, Alberta

Fall 1995



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
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
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
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Dr. Leon H. Craig



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### Abstract

This thesis provides an introduction to a comprehensive study of moderation in Plato's *Republic* primarily through a detailed analysis of its treatment in Books One through Four. The political problem of moderation is closely tied to the problem of justice, and while these two virtues are frequently paired and purposefully confused with each other, this analysis succeeds in separating them. Also, three ranks of moderation are distinguished: "moderation for the multitude", which requires outwardly moderate behaviour; "political moderation", which incorporates an inner accord and harmony; and, a higher rank of moderation that entails philosophical reflection. Of particular emphasis are the roles of the irrational and the spirited parts of the soul in relation to the rule of the rational part. However, the human spirit proves to be the foremost issue in moderation, being both a substantial obstacle in becoming moderate and an invaluable ally of reason in subduing the pleasures, desires, and passions that are problematic for self-rule.

### Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Leon Craig for years of stimulating and challenging teaching, and for many hours of discussing the *Republic* and meticulously reviewing each of my drafts. Throughout all, he has remained steadfastly committed to the highest standards of a truly liberal education. In addition, I owe Heidi Studer an incalculable debt for first introducing me to the study of political philosophy and for being a constant source of encouragement. I am especially grateful to my parents, Eric and Sylvia Lange, who, in addition to their faithful support throughout my studies, provided me with my first experience of virtue through their example. Finally, I offer very special thanks to Charlotte Warwick, who has patiently endured and sustained me throughout this project.

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## Introduction: Statement of Assumptions and Interpretative Principles

Platonic dialogues provide a challenging opportunity to engage in the defining activity of philosophy: thinking.<sup>1</sup> If read in accordance with sensible interpretative principles, I believe that these dialogues necessarily promote that activity, and train one to partake of it to the greatest extent that one is capable. There are two reasons why an explicit statement of these interpretative principles can be useful to the author and the reader in the current context. First, such a statement encourages the author to be self-critical of his assumptions and principles of interpretation, examining both their strengths and their weaknesses. Second, a statement of one's approach to the study of Platonic dialogues may prove useful to others in their own study. For these two reasons, I should like to preface my exploration of moderation in Plato's *Republic* with a brief discussion of key interpretative principles formulated by those with seasoned experience in studying Platonic dialogues, and who share the view that philosophy is first and foremost an activity.

Four main principles have been employed throughout this study. Implicit in these principles are important assumptions about the literary and philosophic features of Platonic dialogues. First, it is reasonable to assume that the literary form which Plato chose for his writings was not arbitrary. The dramatic form of a dialogue provides more than an entertaining medium for conveying the philosopher's ideas. As Stanley Rosen suggests, "Even without entering into any

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<sup>1</sup> For a full articulation of this view, see Leon H. Craig's "Prologue" to *The War Lover*, especially p. xxvi.

theoretical reflections on Platonic dialectic, it is clear that we cannot take the dialogues seriously as expressions of Plato's thought unless we take seriously the extraordinary complexity of their literary form."<sup>2</sup> Compared to a philosophical treatise, a dramatic dialogue presents the reader with a richer variety of information, and thus, a greater interpretative challenge. The setting, action, and characters are all relevant to an adequate understanding of the dialogue. For example, particular arguments may be selected in consideration of the particular characters who are present. Even simple affirmative and negative responses can provide important clues as to the nature of the character, his role in the dialogue, the precise meaning of an argument, and the intent behind it. For example, Adeimantos' objection at the start of Book Four directs the argument into a discussion of the happiness of the entire city and the role of wealth and poverty in political life. In so doing, it also reveals Adeimantos' own attraction to wealth, and more particularly, to the status and honour that typically accompany the possession and consumption of wealth. In addition, his interjection demonstrates the immediate practicality of his concerns, and as we shall see, reveals his own tendency towards immoderation. Sokrates' response addresses his practical concerns by discussing the problems that accompany the existence of wealth and poverty in political life. But Sokrates also takes the opportunity to discuss the true measure of political greatness with Adeimantos. Adeimantos' concern with healthy political life (demonstrated below) makes him an appropriate interlocutor for this discussion, since as we shall see,

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<sup>2</sup> Stanley Rosen, *Plato's Symposium*, pp. xi-xiv.

Glaukon's perspective on these matters is likely to be substantially different. Thus, following the explicit arguments alone is insufficient. The fuller significance of an argument must be considered in relation to the dramatic context of the whole dialogue in order to attain a complete understanding. Leo Strauss asserts that, "one must postpone one's concern with the most serious questions (the philosophic questions) in order to become engrossed in the study of a merely literary question."<sup>3</sup> In the final analysis, however, these two questions cannot remain separated, as if the poetic style has no bearing upon the philosophical substance. Allan Bloom elaborates upon this notion, making of it an important principle of interpretation:

Every argument must be interpreted dramatically, for every argument is incomplete in itself and only the context can supply the missing links. And every dramatic detail must be interpreted philosophically, because these details contain the images of the problems which complete the arguments. Separately these two aspects are meaningless; together they are an invitation to the philosophic quest.<sup>4</sup>

This, then, is the first principle that has guided the present study.

Closely related to this principle regarding the dramatic character of the dialogues is the tenet that one must participate actively in the conversation oneself. Jacob Klein emphasises that:

We have to play our role in them, too. We have to be serious about the contention that a Platonic dialogue, being an 'imitation of Sokrates,' actually continues Sokrates' work...that we, the readers, are being implicitly questioned and examined, that we have to weigh Sokrates' irony, that we are compelled to admit to ourselves our ignorance, that it is up to us to get out of the impasse and to reach a conclusion, if it is reachable at

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<sup>3</sup> Leo Strauss, *The City and Man*, p. 52.

<sup>4</sup> Allan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato*, p. xvi.



all. We are one of the elements of the dialogue and perhaps the most important one.<sup>5</sup>

In this way a dialogue is restored to life; it exercises its full powers within the human soul. Such placing of oneself within the dialogue can prompt one to supply useful dialogical "ingredients" oneself. For example, one might imagine oneself as a juror in the *Apology of Sokrates*, listening to Sokrates' reminders of one's own shameful behaviour when on trial. The resulting anger, and perhaps even vengefulness, contributes to one's understanding of Sokrates' conviction. However, it also raises questions about why he would make such an effort to aggravate his judges. Pursuing this question may lead one to consider the root of the tension inherent in practising philosophy in any existing political community. For reasons such as these, it is important to enter into the drama oneself if one is to arrive at an adequate understanding of a Platonic dialogue.

In conjunction with making one's own dialogical contribution, active participation in a dialogue may facilitate one's understanding of one's own political community. Such sharpening of one's awareness of each dramatic detail and of the subtleties of each argument enhances one's powers of observation generally. In addition, as in other finely crafted dramas, a particular character may represent an archetype of a kind of human psyche. Hence, placing oneself into the role of each character in a dialogue can also contribute to one's understanding of the people encountered in one's own polity. This ability to appreciate the world from all plausible perspectives is essential in synthesising a

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<sup>5</sup> Jacob Klein, *A Commentary on Plato's Meno*, pp. 5-6.

truly comprehensive account of the whole of human life. Thus it is that the dialogues train one to philosophise, not just in response to these writings, but in response to one's environing life.

The former two principles are complemented by the third assumption and its corresponding principle. Drawing upon the discussion of "logographic necessity" in the *Phaedrus* (264b), Strauss states: "Nothing is accidental in a Platonic dialogue; everything is necessary at the place where it occurs. Everything which would be accidental outside of the dialogue becomes meaningful within the dialogue."<sup>6</sup> This assumption is intended to facilitate the activity of philosophy. In ascribing literary perfection to a Platonic dialogue, one is less likely to dismiss what initially seem to be nonsensical arguments, or to overlook seemingly incidental dramatic details. Rather, this assumption promotes meticulous attention to the text, and both clarity and thoroughness of interpretation. It forces the reader to question the completeness of his understanding until everything within the dialogue is accounted for, including the order in which the subjects are discussed. To the extent that one cannot explain any detail of a dialogue, one's understanding remains incomplete.<sup>7</sup> In short, this third interpretative principle presumes that every element of a Platonic dialogue is worthy of careful consideration, and thus dictates that it be accounted for in any complete interpretation.

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<sup>6</sup> Strauss, p. 60.

<sup>7</sup> Bloom, p. xviii.

The final assumption in a sense comprehends the three principles introduced thus far. As Jacob Klein asserts,

"to follow a Platonic dialogue is to take it as it *is*, as *one whole*, in which the interlocutors play a definite and unique role and in which what is *said* and what is *happening* does not depend on anything that is said and is happening in any other dialogue...it is incumbent upon us to understand each dialogue in its *own* terms."<sup>8</sup>

This suggests that the fact that a certain issue is discussed in many different dialogues does not make it essential to study the issue in all of them in order to understand the discussion in any one.<sup>9</sup> For example, even though the governing theme of the *Charmides* is apparently moderation (*sōphrosynē*), it is not essential to study that dialogue in order to understand the discussion of moderation in the *Republic*. The two dialogues may (or may not) be complementary, but we can assume that each one is independently intelligible and to that extent is a self-contained unity. This is not to assume, however, that a given dialogue is intended to provide a complete account of any matter discussed; but merely that the dialogue itself will provide the means for understanding its own limitations. This, then, is the final interpretative principle that has guided this study.

However, the particular character of the study that follows might seem to violate certain aspects of these principles. Insofar as the general approach herein endorsed suggests that one must grasp the *Republic* as a *whole* rather than attempting to abstract a particular part, an exploration of the concept of

<sup>8</sup> Jacob Klein, "About the *Philebus*," *Interpretation*, vol. 2, no. 3, p. 158.

<sup>9</sup> The study of the issue in all of them *might* lead one to understand what Plato himself thought about the issue as a whole, but more importantly to better understand the issue for oneself, that is, what the truth is about it. But in any case, the dialogues cannot be usefully compared until one has first understood them individually.

moderation as it is presented in the *Republic* would seem to contravene these principles. Consequently, the study of a single idea in a Platonic dialogue would seem to require some special justification.

Two points may be made in response to this concern. First, focusing upon one theme or aspect of a dialogue need not violate these interpretative principles. In this case especially, moderation truly *cannot* be studied apart from the rest of the *Republic*, since it is a theme which pervades the entire dialogue through its association with the three other cardinal virtues, its significance to the characters, and its contribution to the *Republic's* other central themes. Hence, just as understanding moderation is essential for a complete interpretation of the *Republic*, moderation itself *must* be studied with regard to the entire dialogue.

Nevertheless, the *Republic* has its own guiding question, namely, what is *justice*. It might seem misguided, then, to explore an apparently secondary theme at length. However, a well-chosen idea can actually facilitate one's study of a Platonic dialogue as a whole. It can serve to focus one's attention and stimulate one's engagement as an active participant. Exploring a dialogue through the study of carefully chosen themes can be an additional means of penetrating deeper into the dialogue. With regard to the *Republic*, not only its ostensible guiding question (concerning justice), but other themes and questions may be appropriate. For example, why is there such an extensive discussion of philosophy in a dialogue explicitly devoted to the question of justice?

Several specific considerations support the validity of the present thesis. First, as one of the four cardinal virtues, moderation receives explicit and exten-

sive treatment throughout the dialogue. Second, it is quite closely associated with the issue of justice itself. Third, the dramatic context suggests that extended attention to moderation would not be inappropriate, as will subsequently be shown. One might notice at the outset, however, that the entire night's discussion is an exercise in moderation, supplanting a fine dinner and a boisterous all-night festival in the Piraeus. For these reasons, then, it is appropriate to undertake a study focused on moderation within the *Republic*, and to do so moreover in the hope that such a study may lead to a fuller understanding of the entire dialogue.

Since this general approach to studying Platonic dialogues suggests that an account is complete only when every detail of a dialogue can be adequately explained, I shall concede at the outset that this study of moderation in the *Republic* will necessarily remain incomplete. In fact, while this study makes use of evidence found throughout the dialogue, its primary focus is upon the account of moderation presented in the first four books. Nevertheless, it will reflect my study of the entire *Republic* using the four interpretative principles above, and if successful should serve as an essential step towards understanding moderation *per se*, as well as towards a fuller understanding of the *Republic* as a whole.



## Chapter One: The Political Problem of Moderation

Moderation, being one of four cardinal virtues, is treated with great care throughout the *Republic*. At the outset of the dialogue, we may presume that the young men with whom Sokrates is conversing possess an ordinary understanding of moderation that is much less precise and less refined than his own. Being aware of this, he naturally chooses a point of departure for his treatment of moderation that is both recognisable and acceptable to them (cf. 389de).<sup>10</sup> As the dialogue progresses, Sokrates reveals an increasingly sophisticated conception of it. However, this treatment of moderation is not without complication; it incorporates many popular views about moderation as well as a distinction in terms. Throughout the *Republic*, Sokrates employs two terms for moderation, and both their similarity and their distinctiveness must be accounted for. As with other prominent terms, while "one supposes his own usage to be both precise and refined, one may also assume—at least provisionally—that it takes its departure from certain distinctions in popular use, which (in turn) reflect already acknowledged nuances of difference in normal human experience."<sup>11</sup> As our examination of moderation also begins from some collection of popular opinions,

<sup>10</sup> Throughout this study, I have used Allan Bloom's translation of Plato's *Republic: The Republic of Plato* (New York: Basic Books, 1968). Occasionally, I have departed from his translation based upon the Greek text in Loeb Classical Library, but these instances are few and usually minor, and consequently, they are not explicitly noted. Citations are noted in the text according to the subdivided Stephanus page: a range of sections is indicated with a dash (e.g., 504b-e; including when it spans across the next Stephanus page), and a piece of text that occurs *on* a subdivision is noted without a dash (e.g., 591ab). In addition, in all cases where italics appear within quotations from the *Republic*, I have added them for emphasis. The only exception in this study is where Sokrates is discussing "being", in which case Bloom has added the emphasis.

<sup>11</sup> Craig, pp. 46-47.

it may be useful to discuss some of these briefly before turning to the *Republic* for an illumination of this virtue. In establishing our point of departure, it will be possible to link such opinions with the two key terms used for moderation throughout the dialogue.

Perhaps most simply, moderation may be thought of in terms of measurement. A moderate amount indicates a middle or average; it refers to a loosely defined range between two extremes. Used in this way, there is no intention to be precise. Even so, this conception of moderation seems to imply a certain amount of knowledge: of the extremes, the criteria of measurement, and how they are used. Thus, there is an element of rational calculation involved in determining what is a moderate amount. This is true of the ancient Greek word, *metrios*, that is sometimes translated as moderate. It is derived from *metron*, "that by which anything is measured", and it may be translated as "measured," "moderate," or even "sensible."<sup>12</sup>

When employed as a term that refers more specifically to human virtue, moderation retains some of its connection to measurement. This is exemplified in the adage, engraved at Delphi: "nothing in excess." This proverbial wisdom reveals a little more about moderation, however, for it shows that the concern is

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<sup>12</sup> Bloom's translation of *metrios* is not consistent throughout the *Republic*. As an adjective it has been translated mostly as "sensible" and "moderate", both of which range in meaning considerably depending on the context. Once it is translated as "average" (460e). The adverb, *metriōs*, is translated as "sensibly", "moderately", and "in proper measure" (or simply, "in measure").

It is worth noting that *metrios* is the etymological root for many of our terms for different kinds of measurement; most obviously, "meter" (as a unit of length, a poetic foot, and an instrument for measuring), but also such words as geometry, metronome, and symmetry.



usually about an excess of some kind rather than a shortage. Moderation, even in terms of measurement, most often refers to an amount relative to some maximum. However, "nothing in excess" tells us very little about what the proper measure of such things are, or how it is that we come to know these measures, or how to employ them usefully. In the course of the *Republic*, the conception of *metrios* is refined as Sokrates shows what is involved in precisely determining the proper measure of anything, and it is a fundamental aspect of a complete account of moderation.

When applied directly to various human activities, "nothing in excess" continues to refer to some middling amount relative to an upper extreme. Regulating the amount to which one engages in various activities therefore requires restraint. While it is, of course, possible to restrain physically someone's behaviour on their behalf (as we sometimes do with children), the virtue of moderation applies more to *self-restraint*. Furthermore, moderation seems to be used most often in reference to certain kinds of activities that human beings find particularly pleasurable, the most prominent examples of which are eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse. While these examples are not exhaustive, we might note that they centre around the exercise of self-control in indulging the pleasures connected with the body. This is a large part of moderation, as it is ordinarily understood, and it is reflected in a number of quasi-synonyms for this kind of self-control, such as continence and temperance, the latter including abstinence and sobriety. While what is considered to be an excess in these activities likely varies considerably from one polity to another, it is nevertheless ap-

parent that some degree of self-control is good, insofar as it facilitates the attainment of one's own goals. This is true not only where the pleasures of the body are concerned, but also in other kinds of desires and pleasures (e.g., the desire for revenge). Perhaps the primary problem for the one who would be moderate is a practical one: there seems to be a lack of any sure connection between such knowledge and the required action. Many have an adequate notion of what is "moderate", but cannot, or do not, act accordingly. Seen in connection with this virtue, the famous Sokratic formula that "virtue is knowledge" would seem highly implausible.

This emphasis upon self-restraint is captured by the ancient Greek word, *sōphrosynē*. This is the term that properly refers to the *virtue* of moderation throughout the *Republic*. It is a compound that means literally, "soundness of mind" or perhaps, "wholeness of mind and will". These literal definitions seem particularly appropriate when one considers how the pleasures connected with the body, or even the indulgence of certain passions (e.g., anger), can negatively effect the steadiness and course of one's mind and will.<sup>13</sup> Employing this sketch of such popular usage, we can now see how the issue of moderation permeates the *Republic* from its beginning.

Having by means of his servant boy stopped Sokrates and Glaukon on the road to the upper city, Polemarchos attempts to force them to stay in Pi-

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<sup>13</sup> Bloom translates *sōphrosynē* and its cognates consistently as moderation, moderate, etc. The only exceptions are in Book One (331e-a) where he uses the literal translation noted above, and in Book Five where *sōphronizein* (literally, "to make moderate") is rendered as "to correct" (471a).

raeus by playfully threatening to deploy the strength of his group of companions. After his ally, Adeimantos, appeals to Sokrates' and Glaukon's curiosity by trying to persuade them to remain to see another spectacle, Polemarchos offers them the promise of dinner and then carousing at an all-night festival, at which they will be with many other young men. To Polemarchos' suggestion, it is Glaukon, Sokrates' young comrade, who responds: "It seems we must stay" (328b). As a result, this journey upward is thwarted by a group of young men, confident in the strength of their numbers, who persuade the philosopher, or rather his young ally, to go back down to Piraeus and pursue the pleasures of the body and whatever else the all-night festival might offer. Thus, the beginning of the dramatic action of the dialogue is directed in part by these young men who intend to indulge their bodily desires for food, drink, and perhaps other pleasures and passions. While introducing us to some of the basic issues of moderation, this opening encounter also serves as a reminder that it is youths, perhaps young men in particular, who follow such desires so readily and daringly, and therefore are most in need of moderation. However, since they never actually indulge in these pleasures throughout the course of the evening, though they talk about them quite a lot, in this sense the entire dramatic action of the *Republic* is a demonstration of moderation.

The events following this episode are similarly guided by these same issues. In his opening speech, Kephalos describes how the pleasures connected with the body "wither away" with age. Apparently, as these decline due to the increasing feebleness of the body and dullness of its senses, "the desires and

pleasures that have to do with speeches grow the more" (328d).<sup>14</sup> The bodily pleasures may be so intense that they hinder the pursuit of other desires and pleasures, to say nothing of one's duties and responsibilities. Kephalos' praise of Sophocles is to the point: "For, in every way, old age brings great peace and freedom from such things. When the desires cease to strain and finally relax, then what Sophocles says comes to pass in every way; it is possible to be rid of many mad masters" (329cd). Nevertheless, even as the natural deterioration of the body forces some degree of moderation upon the aged, Kephalos does *not* say that his *desires* for those bodily pleasures wither away at the same rate as the ability to enjoy them (cf. 328d). Rather, most of his aged friends lament their plight and still pursue those desires as they are able, by "longing for the pleasures of youth and reminiscing about sex, drinking bouts and feasts and all that goes with things of that sort" (329a).<sup>15</sup> For his part, Kephalos argues that "old

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<sup>14</sup> Perhaps this is so, but these latter desires and pleasures may be far from dominant in Kephalos, for he is the only one to excuse himself from the conversation. After this brief exchange he leaves and does not return for the duration of the dialogue. While the cause of his departure is open to speculation (e.g., that Kephalos is not prepared to have his beliefs on these matters questioned when they are of such central importance in his life; or even that Sokrates has succeeded in driving him out), it may be that the desires and pleasures having to do with speech remain comparatively weak when they are not exercised earlier in life, even once the most powerful ones that are opposed to them have passed.

<sup>15</sup> Bacon's interpretation of the fable about Tithonus and Aurora in *The Wisdom of the Ancients* is remarkably similar to Kephalos' account of the reminiscences of old men, but it adds to his discussion:

And so at last when the use of pleasure leaves men, the desire and affection not yet yielding unto death, it comes to pass that men please themselves only by talking and commemorating those things which brought pleasure unto them in the flower of their age, which may be observed in libidinous persons, and also in men of military professions—the one delighting in beastly talk, the other boasting of their valorous deeds, like grasshoppers, whose vigour consists only in their voice.

age is only moderately [*metriös*] troublesome" if one is "balanced and good-tempered" by nature. Intrigued by Kephalos' response, Sokrates lures him into a discussion of wealth and asks him how he has acquired that which he possesses. As it turns out, Kephalos is a sort of mean between his grandfather (who must have been enormously wealthy) and his father (who spent far more than he earned). Kephalos' claim that he himself is a sort of "middling" money-maker suggests that it might be possible to pursue wealth moderately. Yet, insofar as wealth provides the leisure and the means for indulging in the pleasures that come through the body, this would seem to imply that the truly moderate pursuit of wealth would entail the acquisition of little more than what is required to satisfy the needs of the body. However, this clearly is not what Kephalos means. He maintains that it was his grandfather who was the best money-maker and esteems him for it. We may presume that Kephalos has made as much money as he could as well, with the result that he judges himself only "moderately" successful: not as great as his grandfather, but better than his father. He was not actually *aiming* at some "moderate" amount of wealth, but (like most money-makers) for as much as he could get. Thus, while there may be an idea of a "moderate" money-maker, Kephalos is not an example of one. In addition, Kephalos' esteem for his grandfather provides us with a reminder that wealth is also a means to status. For example, the fine clothes that it affords are not for

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Here Bacon seems to add other sorts of pleasures to those associated with the body, in particular the pleasure that comes from honour. Perhaps the excessive pursuit of honour may need to be moderated as well. (In Arthur Gorges translation in *The Essays; The Wisdom of the Ancients; New Atlantis*, p. 237).



the sake of the needs or the pleasures of the body, but for its beautification. Thus, the pursuit of wealth is not only for the sake of the bodily pleasures that it enables one to indulge, but for the status that attends it as well.<sup>16</sup>

Sokrates seems to wish to test Kephalos' love of money, and hence how moderate his money-making actually is, and so he effectively requests that Kephalos praise wealth. It is from this that the subject of justice first arises. Sokrates extracts a definition of justice from Kephalos' description of the greatest good that he has enjoyed from possessing great wealth, and promptly presents a powerful counter-example:

[E]veryone would surely say that if a man takes weapons from a friend when the latter is of sound mind [*sôphronountos*], and the friend demands them back when he is mad, one shouldn't give back such things, and the [man] who gave them back would not be just, and moreover, one should not be willing to tell someone in this state the whole truth. (331c)

Thus, moderation and justice arise together; the soundness of mind of the friend determines the justness of the response. As we shall see, moderation and justice occur together throughout the dialogue; clearly *distinguishing* one from the other will be essential to this examination. Presently, however, it is enough to recognise that the issue of moderation contributes to the genesis of this extensive exploration of justice.

Furthermore, the bodily pleasures of the young men with whom Sokrates is conversing play an important role in guiding the course of the ensuing conversation. After completing their construction of the first city "in rational speech"

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<sup>16</sup> It may be due to the lesser esteem that Kephalos has for his father in this regard that he did not name Polemarchos after his own father, Lysanius, as was customary (cf. 330b).



(i.e., in *logos*), Sokrates and Adeimantos turn to look for justice in it. Adeimantos' uncertain speculation about where it might lie provides Sokrates with the opportunity to offer a vivid description of how such men would eat. Glaukon, however, objects to the unrefined dining facilities and the bland food; he suggests that "[men] who aren't going to be wretched recline on couches and eat from tables and have relishes and desserts just like [men] have nowadays" (372de). His objection leads to the luxuriating of the city, and that in turn to the introduction of warriors, a description of their education, and eventually to the selection of the city's rulers. At that point Sokrates offers another vivid description, this time of the spartan, communal lifestyle of the guardians and auxiliaries. Here *Adeimantos* objects; he argues that the guardians are not happy because they do not share in the wealth of the city and all the desirable things that wealth provides, not least of all, the status and honour that accompany it. This, then, is another example of how the dialogue is guided by the issues surrounding moderation. Adeimantos' objection leads into a discussion of the happiness of the city, the consequences of wealth and poverty generally, how their city will make war, and to a refinement of their understanding of what constitutes a truly great "city".

At the start of Book Five, the conversation is diverted considerably from its course. Having successfully found justice and the other virtues in both the city and the human soul, Sokrates and Glaukon are about to consider the various forms of vice in each. Having made the comparison between virtue and vice, they will then be able to judge between the life of the just man and the life of

the unjust man as to which is more desirable. Polemarchos, however, interrupts. He has been eager to find out more about the liberalisation of sexual relations that Sokrates had mentioned earlier but upon which he did not elaborate. Polemarchos gets Adeimantos to request this elaboration, a request that soon receives unanimous approval from this group of young men. With mock indignation, Adeimantos tells Sokrates that he has robbed them of "a whole section [form; *eidos*] of the argument" (449c). One suspects, however, it is not his sense of justice that has been affronted. It is this erotic diversion that eventually leads to the philosophic heights of the dialogue, including the positing of a philosopher king and the description of the sun-good analogy and the divided line. Whether or not Sokrates is actually manipulating the night's conversation through the concern of these young men for their various desires and pleasures, these examples suggest clearly enough the pervasiveness of such concerns. Not only are these concerns involved in determining the dramatic action of the dialogue, but they are pertinent to the evaluation of a good regime *per se* (cf. 419a, 449d). And if left unchecked, such desires and pleasures can become a grave problem for any polity, as Glaukon and Adeimantos are at least partly aware. As a matter of fact, their joint challenge to Sokrates, which "causes" him to lead them in the construction of their city in *logos*, gives some indication of how the issues surrounding moderation permeate political life.

At the outset of Book Two, the brothers challenge Sokrates to show what justice and injustice are in themselves apart from their reputations and wages. However, both of them bring moderation into question as well. Glaukon begins

with a tripartite categorisation of the kinds of good. Then, he secures from Sokrates the opinion that justice "belongs in the finest kind, which the [man] who is going to be blessed should like both for itself and for what comes out of it" (358a). Glaukon next establishes his challenge upon the opinion that justice is really part of the lowest kind of good: "it seems to belong to the form of drudgery, which should be practised for the sake of wages and the reputation that comes from opinion; but all by itself it should be fled as something hard" (358a). In the first part of his challenge, he describes justice and its origins, concluding that the just is "between what is best—doing injustice without paying the penalty—and what is worst—suffering injustice without being able to avenge oneself" (359a). He argues that it is only due to a "want of vigour" that people agree not to do injustice to one another. Next, through the story of the ring of Gyges, Glaukon suggests that "all those who practice [justice] do so unwillingly, as necessary but not as good" (358c). Anyone given the license (authority; *echousian*) represented in the magical ring would not hesitate to do injustice to others for his own benefit; and, if he is clever, courageous, and strong enough, he would be able to succeed in being as unjust as possible while maintaining a reputation, and receiving the honours and gifts, for being completely just. And, Glaukon argues, such a man would live a much better life than another man who was just throughout his life but had the reputation for being completely unjust, and received the corresponding dishonour and punishments. Viewed in this way, all that is necessary, then, is that one *appear* to be just, for that alone will generate the reputation necessary to receive the corresponding rewards from

the political community. The only advantage that might be left to being just in reality would be that which depends upon the benefit of justice itself being in the soul, apart from any external rewards usually associated with it.

While Glaukon does not mention moderation explicitly, his part of the challenge constitutes an attack on it as well as justice. He suggests that people tend to follow where their desires lead, rather than attempting to exercise control over them, and that everyone naturally desires "to get the better [*pleonexia*: literally, 'to have more']" (359c). These two principles appear to be fundamental in Glaukon's understanding of human nature, and they make moderation as much of a problem as justice. As Glaukon illustrates through the story of the ring of Gyges, some of the most powerful human desires are often the most problematic for maintaining decent political life—the shepherd commits adultery with the king's wife, and with her help he kills the king and takes over the rule. The effectiveness of Glaukon's story presupposes the natural immoderation of men, given a ring of Gyges. If the shepherd was a more moderate man, his injustices might be far less extreme. In addition to this dangerous tendency human beings have towards following where their passions and bodily desires lead them, the restraint demanded by moderation would seem to be contrary to nature, since it is natural to seek to have "more". This suggests that moderation is for the benefit of others in society. Like justice, it is of little *intrinsic* worth for itself. The benefits of immoderation and injustice seem to go hand-in-hand. Thus, a tension exists between what is desirable for individuals and what is good for a wholesome political community. In Glaukon's view, the individual who is best

by nature would be least inclined to be moderate. While his challenge contains this implicit attack on moderation, Adeimantos brings it openly into question, being the first to refer explicitly to it.<sup>17</sup>

Before Sokrates has a chance to respond to Glaukon, Adeimantos eagerly joins in the challenge. He has been waiting throughout Glaukon's speech for him to return to the very point with which he began, that justice belongs to the third kind of good, those things that are longed for only because of their consequences. He returns to this idea and focuses upon the "the arguments opposed to those of which [Glaukon] spoke, those that praise justice and blame injustice" (362e), showing the actual effect of such arguments upon the young who hear them. Adeimantos shows why the conventional arguments in support of justice are woefully inadequate. First, he presents what fathers and other caregivers say in favour of the benefits accruing to one with a *reputation* for justice, emphasising not only the benefits while one is alive, but the rewards from the gods after death. In addition to these, he goes on to criticise the more general kinds of speeches made in private and in public, which he contends actually disparage justice itself. Even the threat of the gods punishing the unjust man while he is alive and afterwards is nullified by the claims that the gods can be persuaded with prayers, rituals, and sacrifices. At the centre of Adeimantos' challenge is an imaginary dialogue between the one who counsels the doing of

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<sup>17</sup> While the general issue of being moderate is introduced earlier, this is the first use of the noun *sōphrosynē*, which refers to the moderation that turns out to be one of the four cardinal virtues in the *Republic*. However, its verbal cognate, *sōphroneō*, and the related adverb, *sōphronōs*, are used three times by Sokrates in Book One, in relation to the counter-example to Kephalos' "definition" of justice. There it is translated "of sound mind".



injustice with a reputation for justice and the one who still tries to resist by raising objections. Adeimantos suggests, however, that all the objections can be answered with rational arguments. As a result, almost no one is willingly just, since from youth onwards they have been persuaded by such speeches that injustice is better if one possesses "a counterfeited seemly exterior" to go with it (366b). What appears to be of utmost concern for Adeimantos is the young, and especially "those who have good natures and have the capacity as it were, to fly to all the things that are said and gather from them what sort of [man] one should be and what way one must follow to go through life best" (365ab). It is these people in particular, epitomised by he and his brother, who make injustice such a large problem when they are reared with such speeches. The consequence of all these arguments is that "the first [man] of this kind to come to power is the first to do injustice to the best of his ability" (366d), and that everyone else must "keep guard over each other for fear injustice be done" (367a). As a result, Adeimantos is suspicious of argument (i.e., rational speech; *logos*) and so in his conclusion he requests of Sokrates: "Now, don't only show us by the argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but show what each in itself does to the [man] who has it that makes the one bad and the other good" (367b).

Thus, Adeimantos sees the problem of justice from a somewhat different perspective than Glaukon—that is, as reflected in ordinary opinions about it—and he realises that moderation, or rather licentiousness, contributes significantly to this problem:



With one tongue they all chant that moderation and justice are fair, but hard and full of drudgery, while intemperance and injustice are sweet and easy to acquire, and shameful only by opinion and law (363ea).<sup>18</sup>

This equivocal praise and blame of both moderation and justice further emphasises the tension between the good of the individual and that of the polity that was highlighted in Glaukon's speech. And for Adeimantos too, moderation is contrary to nature, but for different reasons. The sweetness and ease of intemperance as opposed to the toil involved in moderation make the latter naturally unattractive. Adeimantos is interested in the good life, like his brother, but he seems more concerned with what is easy. His participation in the political community (insofar as it is constituted by the rational division of labour) would seem to be based first of all upon the fact that things are produced more *easily* (370a). Thus, he understands that it is in his interest to uphold that community by at least appearing to be a responsible citizen; this understanding is reflected in his behaviour throughout the conversation.

The very beginning of the dialogue shows Adeimantos with a fairly large group, whereas Glaukon alone is accompanying the philosopher, suggesting that Adeimantos is more closely bound to his fellow citizens than his brother. While it is not clear where his day began, Adeimantos has stayed longer with his companions in the lower city where the public festival was being held. In contrast, Glaukon and Sokrates have already left the lower city and are returning upwards to the higher one (327a). More evidence of his concern for the whole-

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<sup>18</sup> The Greek word that Adeimantos uses for intemperance is *akolasia*. Throughout the *Republic* it is employed most frequently as the opposite of *sōphrosynē*. Bloom translates it sometimes as intemperance, but more often as licentiousness.

someness of the political community is revealed in his pronounced tendency to abide by the conventional standards of politeness and accommodation (unlike some of his companions). Adeimantos understands that there is an easier, more effective, and more polite way than physical force to achieve his ends within the polity; and so, in contrast to Polemarchos, he chooses to use persuasion on Sokrates and Glaukon. Furthermore, Sokrates subtly emphasises Adeimantos' politeness when he re-enters the dialogue in Book Two. Rather than describing Adeimantos' participation as an interruption (331d; 340a) or as a violent attack by a wild beast (336b)—as the interventions of Polemarchos, Kleitophon, and Thrasymachos are characterised—Sokrates notes that Adeimantos speaks 'in his turn' (362d). His reliance upon the polity for a good life and his resulting willingness to support it, make Adeimantos more likely to connect his own good with the good of the community. As a result, people's natural tendency towards licentiousness especially troubles him (as it does not Glaukon). As he notes in his challenge, it means he must always be on guard against his fellow citizens. The alternative, to act oneself like the unjust man with the ring of Gyges, is less appealing due to its difficulty. Adeimantos is perhaps not as ambitious as his brother, preferring to be able to live by the laws since 'it's not always easy to do bad and get away with it unnoticed' (365cd). He blames the poor rearing and education of the youth for this predicament (366ea; cf. 376d). Thus, Adeimantos provides us with a deeper appreciation of the connection between moderation, justice, and the role of education in a wholesome polity.

Glaukon's and Adeimantos' joint challenge has suggested the importance of an adequate conception of moderation for wholesome political life. Their understanding of moderation suggests that it is placed by most people in that same category of "goods" as is justice—those things that "we would not choose to have...for themselves but for the sake of the wages and whatever else comes out of them" (357cd). Yet, simply appearing moderate is not sufficient to acquire all of its benefits, as may be the case with justice. For example, one must be able to restrain one's immediate desires in order both to avoid ruining one's health and to acquire greater goods in the future. Thus, despite the difficulty and drudgery in actually attaining moderation, it is fairly obvious that extreme licentiousness is unhealthy, despite its being "sweet and easy to acquire". Nevertheless, moderation is explicitly introduced in the *Republic* by Adeimantos as something naturally *unappealing*, and of *limited* usefulness for the private individual. As a result, moderation would seem to be in need of a defence similar to that which Glaukon and Adeimantos request for justice. While this is provided in the course of the evening's discussion, what their challenge directly leads to is Sokrates' suggestion that they construct a city in *logos* wherein to see justice writ large (whatever else one might see there). It is in this context that moderation is first treated in detail: as an essential component of its civic education. In order to see why moderation becomes a prominent issue in the city in *logos*, we must briefly sketch the construction of this city.

Ostensibly in order to see justice and injustice more clearly, Sokrates and Adeimantos agree to investigate them in something larger; that is, in cities. Hav-

ing done so, they will return to consider them in individuals. Thus is an analogy established between the city and the human soul. This agreement is quickly transformed into the watching of a city coming into being, and then into the endeavour to make, from the beginning, a city in *logos* that suits themselves (368e-c). In the process, four discernible cities are described. The first is the true (or truthful), healthy, and anarchic city that Glaukon contends is a "city of pigs" (372d-e). The luxuriated and feverish city that follows is "gorged with a bulky mass of things" (373a). This city is then purged or purified (*kathairō*; 399e), resulting in still a third city, whose description is completed by the middle of Book Four (427d). It serves as the model city in which they look for justice. Fourth, is the city of the philosopher king whose description begins in Book Five and is elaborated through Book Seven.

The first city is supposedly grounded in man's neediness, in particular, with respect to the basic material necessities of life. However, the construction of their city in *logos* actually obscures what constitutes a basic "need". They begin by agreeing upon the need for food, shelter, and clothing. But then Sokrates asks about the strict need for shoes as well. This more problematic example serves as a transition from the provision of the necessities of subsistence to the satisfaction of human desires and tastes that go beyond bodily needs, and thereby suggests the existence of a natural human longing for something more than the necessary. As Glaukon demonstrates, as soon as people are aware of more pleasing alternatives they want them, and surely the power of the human imagination will always suggest more pleasing alternatives to some. It becomes

necessary in politics, then, to accommodate human beings' love of pleasure, comfort, and ease—in sum, love of luxury. Such *political* necessity results in the luxuriating of the first city in *logos*. This requires the addition of a "bulky mass" (373b) of artisans to produce the new luxuries, which in turn results in the need for greater agricultural production to feed them. Hence, this second city requires more land, presumably already claimed by neighbouring peoples, and this gives rise to war.

As "the struggle for victory in war" is agreed to be an art, the three-fold rational division of labour that assigned each person to a single art according to his nature (370a-c) entails the addition of a group of warriors to the city who are devoted solely to this art. It is subsequently agreed that to some extent "the work of the guardians is more important" than that of the other artisans (374ea). Given the urgency of self-defence in the moment of attack, and the alternatives of destruction, subjugation, or slavery for an entire city, having naturally warlike men who practise nothing other than the art of war, and are available for this task at any moment does seem to be indispensable. So the discussion turns to the selection of suitable natures for this art, and then to their education (374de). Engendering moderation in these warriors becomes an important goal of the education as a whole. Understanding why this is so requires that we first understand why it is that, despite the city being composed of a diversity of people each practising the art best suited to his nature, only the education required for the practitioners of the art of war is the focus of explicit attention. As a result, we



must begin with an understanding of their nature and why that nature must receive a very specific kind of education.

Sokrates and Glaukon agree that they must choose "a nature fit for the pursuit" of guarding a city (374e). Having agreed upon three bodily characteristics, they agree that courage is required as well. Courage, however, is rooted in spiritedness, as the spirit is "irresistible and unbeatable" and "makes every soul fearless and invincible in the face of everything" (375b). While these characteristics of the spirit are especially useful in a warrior, the spirit is also problematic. It is likely to make them "savage to one another and the rest of the citizens" (375b). Indeed, these men are a formidable threat to the city, especially since they will possess the weapons and the training whereby they may take what they wish, and they certainly would not be lacking the boldness to do so. In Thrasymachos' terms, they are the stronger and ought to attempt to rule in their own advantage (338e); and in Glaukon's view, they would be "mad" to do otherwise (359b), since it is only natural that they should always want more. Moreover, for these same reasons these warriors would believe that they have a *right* to do so. Consequently, Sokrates suggests that he and Glaukon must find "a disposition at the same time gentle and great-spirited" (375c). And yet, these two natures seem opposed to one another. The dilemma appears resolved in the "disposition of noble dogs" (375e), for they manifest both characteristics "by nature". Yet this evidence that gentleness and great-spiritedness can dwell together in the same disposition in some nature does not show that they necessarily can be made to harmonise within *human* nature. Nevertheless, having



agreed that the natural possibility exists, they go on to discuss how one with such a disposition determines when to be gentle and when to be harsh. Here, Sokrates suggests an additional quality of the fit guardian—he will need “to be a philosopher in his nature” (375e). As an example of what he means, Sokrates suggests that because dogs learn thoroughly to distinguish between what is their own and what is alien, and because they act according to this “knowledge,” they are lovers of learning. Since Glaukon does not object to the speciousness of this conclusion, and since he does not distinguish between love of learning and love of wisdom, Sokrates leads him to conclude (apparently playfully) that dogs are “philosophic” in their nature. Nevertheless, this ability to discriminate on the basis of learning and to act accordingly *is* the very characteristic required for managing and taming the potential warriors’ coarse boldness. Even so, for practical purposes almost any healthy human being can make discriminations on the basis of learning as well as dogs, and hence, great-spiritedness remains the most consequential quality of soul in the selection of the warriors’ nature.

Thus, even after having determined the nature suitable for men who would be warriors, they still must be educated. The most important issue, however, is not so much to teach them who or what are their own and who or what are their enemies (375c), as it is to train their spirits so that they will always behave in accordance with such convictions. Hence, an adequate education for young men with such natures becomes the focal issue. And, the primary purpose of the musical component of the education is to charm, and thereby

tame, the spirit (411a-e) in order to make it more tractable to the rule of reason. Thus, the problem caused by the human spirit is the catalyst for the careful construction of the state education that follows. Given that moderation is one of the two most important virtues that this education is attempting to instil (cf. 399bc, 410ea), it is likely that the warriors' greatness of *spirit* is the special problem involved in their acquisition of moderation.

Thus, one may contend that moderation is a political problem of the same order as that of justice. Neither of these virtues seems to be intrinsically good in itself, but rather primarily serves the benefit of others. And, their frequent pairing together suggests that they are closely associated with one another. By the time Sokrates and Glaukon find themselves in a position to see justice and moderation in the city and in the soul, it will be necessary to discover how these two virtues differ from each other. Presently, however, they turn to educating their potential warriors, and the character of the spirited part of their nature does prove to be a crucial consideration in their acquisition of moderation.

## Chapter Two: Cultivating Moderation Through Education

Moderation is introduced into the education of the potential warriors as merely one of several different aspects of civic virtue. But as Sokrates, Adeimantos, and Glaukon reform the various components of the traditional education, it becomes clear that moderation is one of the two most important virtues that the education is to instil. The conception of moderation discussed throughout Book Three of the *Republic* continues to focus ostensibly upon the pleasures connected with the body. We shall discuss in detail the explicit treatment of moderation in the reforms to the speech component of "music", and then go on to consider how the rest of the reforms in education also contribute towards instilling this virtue. In the course of this examination, we will not only come to a better understanding of what moderation is and how it is acquired, we will also find that in addition to the bodily pleasures, the spirited nature of these young men is deeply involved in their struggle to become moderate.

The traditional education in music and gymnastic is adopted by Sokrates and his comrades, but only on condition of substantial reforms being made in its content. Regarding music, they first reform the verbal content of the speeches, then the style of presentation, and finally the melodic and rhythmic accompaniment. The models of speech discussed in Books Two and Three promote several aspects of civic virtue by instilling salutary beliefs in the potential warriors. Piety would seem to be the first concern; warriors must have a proper conception of the divinities if they "would honour gods and ancestors and not take

lightly their friendship with each other" (386a). The second concern, courage, is treated as primarily a matter of how one stands towards death. In particular, warriors "must be free and accustomed to fearing slavery more than death" (387b). Next, they censor the "laments and wailings of famous men" (387d) and of gods. Such things are to be thought to be shameful and ought only to elicit scornful laughter (388d); a man ought to learn to endure misfortune and suffering without complaining or lamenting. They agree that he who "is most of all sufficient unto himself for living well...has least need of another" (387de). Fourth, the warriors are not to be lovers of laughter, since laughter is capable of completely altering one's state of mind: "for when a [man] lets himself go and laughs mightily, he also seeks a mighty change to accompany his condition" (388e). Most importantly, the persuasive power of rational speech (*logos*) may be muted as a result of either lamentation or laughter; that is, the judgement of these warriors may be distorted or even subverted by such passions. For this reason, Sokrates' suggests that he and Adeimantos must be persuaded by their own argument "until someone persuades us with another and finer one" (388ea). The fifth concern, that they take the truth seriously, is the only one in which they speak explicitly of punishing violators. All private men are to be honest in their relations with each another and with the public authorities, whereas the rulers are allowed to lie, but only for the benefit of the city (389b; cf. 382cd; 459c). Finally, Sokrates introduces moderation by name in the form of a question to Adeimantos:

"And what about this? Won't our youngsters need moderation?"  
 "Of course."

Perhaps because Adeimantos has already demonstrated his sensitivity to this issue, Sokrates wastes no time in opening it fully:

"Aren't these the most important elements of moderation for the multitude: being obedient to the rulers, and being themselves rulers of the pleasures of drink, sex, and eating?"

"They are, at least in my opinion." (389de)

A detailed analysis of this brief exchange and the examples that follow it lead us to a fuller understanding of moderation, and what is involved in its acquisition.

Before examining these most important elements, however, it is instructive to consider several preliminary aspects of this description of moderation, beginning with the suggestion that moderation is a special issue for youths. Although the education described throughout Books Two and Three is directed towards those youths who are spirited enough to be warriors for the city, youthfulness *per se* is mentioned most frequently in the various discussions of moderation (e.g., 390a-b, 410a; cf. 431b-c). Strictly speaking, none of the virtues are innate in the young; they must be learned. However, obedience to authority and the mastery of one's bodily pleasures in particular do not come naturally for those who are only just coming into full possession of their passions and powers. As noted above, the dramatic action of the *Republic* portrays this reality. Second, these are said to be only the "most important elements" of this kind of moderation.<sup>19</sup> It is therefore implied that this description is not exhaustive; there are other things

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<sup>19</sup> It may be helpful to note that "the most important elements" translates *ta toiade megista*. The neuter plural adjective is used as a substantive, and hence Bloom supplies the noun that is implied, that is, "elements". Alternatively, this phrase could be translated, "the most important things of moderation." Hence, the connotations associated with "element" are not present in the Greek (e.g., that these are the most basic or rudimentary constituents of moderation).



involved as well, as our analysis of the examples that follow will reveal. Third, this is explicitly said to be "moderation for the multitude [*plêthos*]". This suggests that there may be other kinds of moderation for other kinds of people. The disparaging connotations associated with "the multitude" further suggest that there may be a more refined or sophisticated conception of moderation for the few. Finally, it ought to be noted that this description of moderation is divided into two parts. The division is between the predominately public realm of human life and the predominately private realm. Of the preceding five aspects of civic virtue, this is the first time this distinction is made explicit—moderation clearly applies to both the public and private realms of one's life. While this division suggests that there is a significant distinction between the two parts, and whereas we most commonly think of the public and private realms as being radically distinct, their placement under the one term "moderation for the multitude" suggests that they share something essential in common as well. A closer examination will help to understand their relationship to one another.

The first and explicitly public part of moderation for the multitude is "being obedient to the rulers". To begin with, the moderation of the citizens of the city in *logos* would seem to be achieved first of all through legislation and its enforcement. This seems to be a natural and necessary arrangement, just as a child learns what it is to rule himself through the experience of having to obey the demands of his parents or else face their punishment, and through his imitation of their examples. However, this requires that the parents are consistent and thoughtful in their demands, and also that they provide good examples. Simi-



larly, the rulers of this city must be good legislators and adept at ruling themselves, especially since there is no one to police them.

Second, it seems clear that moderation is tied to the issue of ruling, and thus points to such questions as: What is proper rule? Who ought to rule? How does one rule? We might note here that while at this point in their discussion the rulers have not yet been selected, the multitude is already tacitly excluded from consideration. Eventually, the first criteria of selection is that the rulers must come from this group of great-spirited warriors. This will prove to be relevant as our examination of the two parts of this description of moderation proceeds.

Third, this formulation of moderation connects it once again to the issue of justice, since it is similar to the second aspect of Thrasymachos' definition of what is just. For while Thrasymachos had argued that justice is the advantage of the stronger, he was compelled to add that "it is just to obey [*peithein*] the rulers" (339b). However, there is a slight difference between Sokrates' addition to Thrasymachos' definition of justice and the first part of this description of moderation for the multitude. In its passive voice, the verb, *peithein*, can mean either to be persuaded or to obey. However, in his formulation of "being obedient to rulers", Sokrates uses the adjective, *hypēkoos*, which means literally "listening to" or "attentive", and hence "obedient" or "subject". What is absent in the case of moderation for the multitude, then, is the reliance on persuasion through rational speech. While the multitude can be persuaded that they ought to act moderately, not everyone can always be trusted to do so. Thus, the emphasis in moderation for the multitude is more upon simply listening to and obeying their

rulers than upon being persuaded; this would seem to be the equivalent of legal justice.

The second and more private part of moderation for the multitude entails "being themselves rulers of the pleasures of drink, sex, and eating". Again the focus is upon ruling, in this case self-rule; and as applied to the private man and his individual soul, the questions raised earlier remain pertinent: What is the proper rule of one's soul? What in it ought to rule? How does that part rule? Just as the multitude was already excluded from consideration, the desires for the pleasures of drink, sex, and eating are not candidates for the leadership of the soul—they are what must be ruled. And, just as the selection of the rulers in the city is made first of all from those who are great-spirited, it is likely that spiritedness also has a special connection to the rule of the soul.<sup>20</sup> As we will see in the discussion of the examples that follow, the spirit does play a role in both parts of moderation for the multitude.

In addition, the parallel between the two parts of this description suggests that the multitude may be closely identified with these three pleasures. Perhaps it is the amount of attention that most people give the pleasures of drink, sex, and eating, and their concern over gratifying their desires for them, that is the basis for assigning these people to the part of the political community that must be ruled.

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<sup>20</sup> Aristotle takes this conjecture even further. Speaking of the political multitude, especially "of what quality of persons they should be in their nature", he asserts: "Both the element of ruling and the element of freedom stem from this capacity for everyone: spiritedness is a thing expert at ruling and indomitable." (In Carnes Lord's translation of the *Politics*, 1327b19-1328a8)

While ruling is emphasised in both parts of this description of moderation, it is certain specific pleasures that are the focus of the second part. As we saw in the opening discussion with Kephalos, there seems to be at least two kinds of pleasures that are opposed to one another; there are the pleasures that are connected with the body and those having to do with speeches. Only the former kind appear to be the subject of moderation. In addition, Glaukon presumes that there are harmless as well as harmful pleasures; he had suggested that the first kind of good—that which is chosen for its own sake—was exemplified by "enjoyment and all the pleasures which are harmless and leave no after effects other than the enjoyment in having them" (357b). However, he neglects to give any concrete examples of the harmless variety (perhaps believing them to be self-evident), whereas for the other two categories of goods he is careful to provide specific examples.

As far as the rule of one's pleasures is concerned, there appears to be several distinct possibilities. First, as pleasure is the enjoyment that accompanies certain activities, it may be effectively ruled by refraining from those activities or otherwise controlling the amount one participates in them. However, this does not sufficiently address the problem, for it is one's *desires* for such pleasures that must ultimately be mastered. Yet, at this point in Sokrates' treatment of moderation, the focus remains upon the pleasures, and accordingly we will limit our attention to them.<sup>21</sup> Second, it seems that some pleasures effectively "rule"

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<sup>21</sup> Ruling one's desires are treated at greater length in Book Four of the dialogue, and so will be commented upon when it is discussed.

others through their relative intensity. This seems to be what Kephalos suggests happens as one ages; for example, the pleasure that accompanies thought may be discovered or cultivated only much later in one's life.<sup>22</sup> Thus, some pleasures may naturally change in intensity over time. A third alternative in ruling the pleasures seems to be that one may actually transform that in which one takes enjoyment. For example, this seems to be true of those pleasures for which many people must "acquire a taste" (e.g., fine wine, great art, or classical music). In fact, the speech component of the education is attempting to do just this by cultivating the taste of these young men about what things are noble or beautiful (*kalos*) and what things are shameful or ugly (*aischros*). Thus, one may come to desire certain "new" pleasures. Given the abstract nature of this discussion and the concrete differences among particular pleasures, perhaps it would be useful to examine more closely the specific pleasures Sokrates has mentioned.

The pleasures of drink, sex, and eating are all directly connected to the body, and such pleasures appear to be the most important ones to rule if one is

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<sup>22</sup> As noted above, Kephalos engages more in the pleasures that have to do with speeches only after the pleasures connected with the body have subsided due to physical deterioration. However, it is possible that others, like Glaukon and Adeimantos perhaps, could choose the pleasures connected with thought even while their bodies are at the pinnacle of their strength and sensitivity (cf. 357bc; 367cd).

to be moderate.<sup>23</sup> In the case of the pleasures of drink and eating, such rule entails setting limits upon the activities that these pleasures accompany, rather than eliminating them altogether, as drink and food are, of course, necessary for life. With respect to these pleasures, one finds that in some cases the frequency of the activity *dulls* the pleasure. As a result, the memory of the pleasure when certain tastes (e.g., chocolate bars) were new and intense seems to drive one to seek for newer culinary experiences (e.g., chocolate tortes and truffles) that are as enjoyable as the first once were. This almost always entails moving from simpler experiences to more sophisticated ones, as Glaukon's objection to the food and eating arrangements of the first city showed. This also suggests that such pleasures are not derived merely from drink and food *per se*, but from particular kinds of drink and food. Moderation becomes an issue when the pleasure derived from consuming these kinds of food and drink leads to unhealthy over-indulgence. For example, obesity and alcoholism do not arise because one is hungry or thirsty *per se*. Eating too much bread and drinking too much water are not normally a problem. Thus, it remains possible then to rule such pleasures by restraining one's indulgence in the particular drinks and foods that

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<sup>23</sup> In particular, these pleasures are connected to the body's senses, especially those of touch, taste, and smell. Thus, two of the body's senses (seeing and hearing) do not appear to be of foremost concern in the attempt to become moderate. Later, Sokrates will discuss lovers of sights and lovers of hearing in trying to distinguish and thus define the philosopher. The lover of the sight of the truth is likened to him most directly (cf. 475 d-e). Those senses that have to do more directly with the body are excluded from this later discussion, suggesting that the philosopher is not as concerned with the pleasure that comes through them.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle's treatment of moderation focuses upon the pleasures connected with taste and touch in particular. His discussion is illustrated with a number of useful examples (1118a2-b7).



one finds most pleasurable. Moreover, abstaining from these more pleasant things counteracts the tendency to invest all such pleasures with undue importance.

Sex seems to pose a different problem. Strictly speaking, it is not necessary for the subsistence of the individual; and therefore, the pleasure involved can be ruled through abstinence. However, this way of ruling the pleasure of sex could only apply to a minority in any polity. For, in the first place, procreation is necessary for the perpetuation of every political community. Second, sex would seem to be a political necessity in that human longing for its pleasures is practically irrepressible in the population generally. And, insofar as it is (as Glaukon attests) the greatest, keenest, and maddest pleasure for most people (402e-a; cf. 458d), every city must employ some means of ruling it. Simply restricting the frequency of the activity in this case will not necessarily reduce the intensity of the pleasure, nor attenuate the desire. The history of literature provides ample evidence of sex-starved men and their desperate, incredible attempts to satisfy their desires. It is no surprise, then, that madness [*mania*] is another antonym for moderation.<sup>24</sup> Hence, most polities must employ numerous

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<sup>24</sup> Thus, the literal translation of *sôphrosynê* as "soundness of mind" seems particularly apt. In fact, Sokrates' first use of the term, in his counter-example to Kephalos' view of justice, clearly sets madness in opposition to soundness of mind (331c). Kephalos himself is the first to introduce madness into the *Republic*, in relation to his description of the frenzied and savage pleasures of youth (329c). As the term is used through the dialogue, it comes to describe a state in which the human soul suffers from temporary or enduring rule of a chaotic, inharmonious, immoderate, but overwhelming tyrannical force (573c; 577d; 578a). As a result, a person may be driven to undertake extraordinary deeds which most people would consider to be lacking in common sense and indicative of a basic ignorance of, or indifference to, the consequences of his actions (331c, 341c, 382c). The person appears and feels out of control. Hence, madness seems to be opposed to reason; it is even an apt description of nihilism (539c). It is



conventions, strict prohibitions, and various kinds of rigorous enforcement in ruling this pleasure (cf. 403b-c, 458e, 461a-c).<sup>25</sup> We will return to this complicated problem below, in our analysis of Sokrates' examples of moderation and licentiousness.

In keeping with the approach taken in discussing the other aspects of civic virtue, Sokrates follows his general description of what moderation is about with a series of examples from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Just as the description of moderation is divided into two parts, he first gives examples pertaining to obedience to rulers, and then others pertaining to the rule of the pleasures of drink, sex, and eating. In the first, Diomedes exemplifies the kind of obedience that a warrior is to display. This example is taken from Book Four of the *Iliad*, where Agamemnon is putting his army in order, and stirring up the men's spirits for battle. When he comes to the "high-spirited [*hyperthymon*] Diomedes" (the youngest of the Achaian kings to fight at Troy), and finds him standing still, Aga-

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therefore considered to be part of vice (400b) and in particular, akin to licentiousness (403a) and simply opposed to moderation (573b).

<sup>25</sup> If Adeimantos is correct in asserting that the "whole community of women and children" and all the arrangements that go along with it "makes a big difference, or rather, the whole difference, in a regime's being right or not right" (449d), one might take special note of how these things are arranged in other polities imagined by philosophers. For a very peculiar treatment, one might consider Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis*. When asked about the laws and customs concerning marriage, and whether marriage was well kept in Bensalem, Joabin responds with a severe condemnation of European practices and then curiously fails to address the question adequately before he is called away. This leaves open many possible arrangements, and evidence must be gathered from throughout the story to construct a more complete account.

Thomas More offers many more details in his *Utopia* (which the second prefatory letter asserts "should be studied by many, as going far beyond Plato's *Republic*"). Perhaps most memorable is the practise of prospective brides and grooms seeing each other naked. However, once again the picture is incomplete and all of the details require careful consideration in order to understand how such practises would affect a polity. (In Robert Adams' translation, p. 113).

memnon scolds him by asserting that he is not living up to his father's reputation as a great warrior, and gives an example of Tydeus' impressive fighting ability. Diomedes is not angered by this, but appears to be silently obedient, "in awe before the majesty of the king's rebuking" (402).<sup>26</sup> However, Sthenelos, Diomedes' fighting companion, is angry, even though he was not addressed by Agamemnon and his honour was not directly called into question. He calls Agamemnon a liar and defends both himself and Diomedes with a story of their previous glory in battle. Diomedes, however, refuses his defence with the line quoted by Sokrates, "Friend, keep quiet, and obey my word."<sup>27</sup> He then goes on to rebuke Sthenelos for placing his own honour before that of Agamemnon, for whose sake all the Achaians have gathered. He concludes a few lines later, "Come, let you and me remember our fighting courage" (418).<sup>28</sup> As this example suggests, success in war entails that soldiers follow the commands of their superiors immediately, without objection or question. Such obedience requires them to subdue their own desires and fears, and to let their "wills" be governed by someone else. However, this example also suggests that what might be most important in rendering such obedience is the restraint of the spirit. As the spirit is the seat of anger (e.g., 439e-440d; 572a) and is particularly sensitive to praise and blame (581ab), this first example of moderation suggests that obedience to

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<sup>26</sup> All quotes from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are taken from Richmond Lattimore's translations: *The Iliad of Homer* and *The Odyssey of Homer*. Occasionally, I have made changes (usually minor) based upon the Greek texts in the Loeb Classical Library.

<sup>27</sup> Diomedes and Sthenelos are both leaders of the men from Argos, but Diomedes is the recognised superior [II: 567].

<sup>28</sup> In the battle that follows, Diomedes proves himself to be the most warlike of the Achaians and worthy of his father's reputation, while Sthenelos remains in the chariot (V: 109) and wishes to hold back and retreat (V: 249-250).

rulers entails the rule of one's own spirit. This would seem to be particularly true for the great-spirited young men who are the intended recipients of this education. Not only does the young "high-spirited" Diomedes provide an excellent example of such moderation, but his exchange with Sthenelos shows how spirited men may be ruled externally through their respect for those whom they honour (i.e., they may take pride in being one of those worthy to follow the "great").

A second example from the *Iliad* of such silent obedience follows: "Breathing might [valour; prowess; *meneia*] the Achaians went / In silence, afraid of their leaders" (389e). While the second of these lines is from the passage that follows the example of Diomedes, the first line is from Book Three. Both refer to the same battle and to the silence of the Achaian soldiers as they enter into it.<sup>29</sup> In pairing together these two widely-separated lines, Sokrates emphasises the valour of the Achaian army in *conjunction* with the silent obedience shown to their leaders. However, it should be added that, according to Homer, this obedience is rendered out of fear. This alternative way to rule spirited men proves particularly effective with the multitude of the Achaian army. While not everyone will willingly obey out of their respect for their leaders, many more can be made to obey out of fear.

Sokrates' careful selection and conjunction of these lines focuses our attention on the spirit even further. The line in the *Iliad* that follows the first that

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<sup>29</sup> Almost two complete books of the *Iliad* stand between these two beginnings of the same battle. The delay in the fighting was caused by the single combat between Paris and Menelaos, while the two armies were seated and looked on. While Menelaos won by mortally wounding Paris, and based upon their agreement should have been given Helen and returned home (thereby ending the war), the gods intervened and stirred up the fighting once again.

Sokrates quotes, describes the Achaian soldiers wishing eagerly [*maō*] in their spirits to assist each other (III, 9). By omitting this line and replacing it with the one from Book Four, Sokrates places the courage of the soldiers under the rule of their leaders, rather than allowing it to be said that their courage was simply directed by the desires of their own spirits. And, as the courage or valour of the Achaian army is certainly a result of the spiritedness of its soldiers (cf. 375ab), Sokrates' example suggests that it is primarily moderation that makes such spirited courage *useful* to that which rules it by making one's spirit more tractable to being ruled. It is not difficult to see, then, the importance of moderation if these young men are to be harsh to some while remaining gentle towards others. Therefore, Sokrates' first two examples reveal the problem that the spirit poses for the one who would become moderate.

Adeimantos agrees that both of these quotes are fine [or noble; *kalos*] examples of the sort of thing that must be said in speech. However, it is worth noting that these are the *first* examples given in their reformation of traditional education of something that must be *retained* from Homeric poetry. This is especially interesting since it would seem that the *Iliad* is first of all the story of Achilles' anger and disobedience, that is, of a famous hero's *immoderate* behaviour and its consequences. In fact, as the examples that follow show, it is precisely Achilles' most characteristic behaviour that is going to be expunged from the speeches of the reformed musical education.

The third passage that Sokrates cites exemplifies the sort of disobedience to rulers that must be censored from the *Iliad*. It is in fact the first words of Achil-

les' angry speech against Agamemnon after the latter announced that he would take Briseis from Achilles. And it is this dispute, of course, that precipitates the entire action of the *Iliad*. The goddess Athena had just persuaded Achilles not to kill Agamemnon in his anger, which was the first impulse of his spirit (I, 193-4). Instead, in the presence of the Achaian assembly, Achilles describes their ruler, Agamemnon, as being "heavy with wine, with eyes of a dog, and heart of a deer"; that is, of being drunken, shameless, and cowardly. The consequence of Achilles' failure to control the passions of his spirit and render obedience to Agamemnon is the source of "ten thousand pains...put upon the Achaians" as described in the *Iliad* (I, 2). Thus, Sokrates censors Achilles' anger, referring to it as "the youthful insolence of private men to rulers" (390e), the implication being that Achilles is unfit to rule since he cannot rule himself. Throughout the rest of this education, Sokrates effectively "reforms" Achilles by removing his most "Achilles-like" features. By the time Sokrates has finished, Achilles has been made far more moderate, and therefore more tractable to being ruled; but simultaneously, the moving force behind the *Iliad*, his unruly spirit, has been expunged.

However, this third example brings into question Agamemnon's suitability to rule as well. He had originally taken the Trojan priest's daughter for his prize, but the priest came to supplicate him and "ransom back his daughter, carrying gifts beyond count and holding in his hands wound on a staff of gold the ribbons of Apollo" (I, 12-14). While the rest of the Achaian army was persuaded, Agamemnon was furious and drove the priest out of the camp with harsh threats.



However, at the request of the priest, Apollo sent a plague upon the Achaians, and Agamemnon was finally forced to return the girl to her father. Agamemnon's anger, fuelled by his sexual desire and his pride (I, 111-119), is the catalyst for the dispute between him and Achilles.<sup>30</sup> Here again, then, the spirit presents a problem for moderation, and it suggests that Agamemnon is not much better suited to rule than Achilles. Furthermore, Achilles' alleges that Agamemnon is a drunkard; if this is so, it is difficult for the Achaian soldiers to obey him wholeheartedly, since he cannot even rule himself (149-151). Such self-mastery is essential if a leader is to be respected by his followers. Indeed, it provides a crucial example for one's followers, since such self-mastery is the perquisite for being able to obey willingly anyone else.

The second half of the examples of moderation for the multitude pertain to the rule of the pleasures of drink, sex, and eating. These examples are said to be unfit for "a young [man] to hear for his self-mastery" (390b). Rule of such pleasures is the first step in moderation; for, being capable of obeying oneself is necessary if one is to render willing obedience to one's rulers. Sokrates begins with an example of immoderation regarding drinking and eating. Calling Odysseus "the wisest of men"; Sokrates nevertheless wishes to censor him for his apparent praise of feasting and drinking. If the young men they are educating are

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<sup>30</sup> Achilles' remark that Agamemnon has the "eyes of a dog" [*kyōn ommatos*] is generally taken to refer to his shamelessness. In the earlier stages of this dispute with Agamemnon, Achilles used the term *kynōpa*, which means "dog-eyed" or "shameless." This term and its cognates are employed only five other times throughout the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. All of the other references are to shameless women, particularly in relation to marital infidelity. This includes Helen, Aphrodite, and Agamemnon's wife. Consequently, this term "dog-eyed" has strong connotations of sexual intemperance.



to be champions of war, they must not take more pride in drinking competitions and feasting than in their ability to endure hardship in order to be victorious in battle. However, the lines of the *Odyssey* that precede Sokrates' quote reminds us of how normal it is for humans to celebrate with great feasts. And this itself shows the importance of food and drink in human life, and how their significance transcends the needs and wants of the body. In addition, Odysseus' speech may also indicate that such concerns may be directed towards a greater public end, since his judgement that this is "the finest of all things" appears to be ambiguous. He may be referring to the feasting itself, but he may instead (or in addition) be referring to the order and unity—the communal good will—among the people that occurs during such a festivity (IX, 5-11). When properly arranged, public celebrations help to engender a camaraderie among the citizenry and an affection towards the rulers, which can itself facilitate willing obedience. It seems likely that Sokrates recognises this, however, as he is careful to censor the direct references to food and drink, while leaving the festivity *per se*; that is, he retains the "merriment [literally, 'well-mindedness'; *euphrosynē*]" and the people "sitting in order listening to a singer" (IX, 7-8). Thus, while public festivities themselves are not censored, their excessive emphasis upon feasting and drinking are, insofar as they are not conducive to self-mastery.

While these potential warriors must not believe that feasting and drinking are the best of all things, in his next example Sokrates seems to show the consequences for those who cannot restrain themselves from engaging in the pleas-

ure of food in particular. The case is as follows. Odysseus and his men have remained on an island for a month due to contrary winds and have only now run out of provisions. While Odysseus is away praying to the gods for guidance, Eurylochos, with the words quoted by Sokrates, persuades Odysseus' companions to kill and eat the sun-god's cattle. They do this despite having been warned by Odysseus (as he himself was forewarned by Circe; *Odyssey*, XII, 139-141), and despite all of them having made an oath not to do so. The outcome is the destruction of their ship and the death of all but Odysseus. This would seem to be a powerful example of the need to rule the pleasure of eating, and Sokrates' brief quote of Eurylochos suggests that simply expunging such bad examples will be effective in this regard. However, that seems terribly naive, and when taken in the context of the story as it appears in the *Odyssey*, determining what this example actually shows is not nearly so straightforward as Sokrates implies.

Eurylochos and the rest of Odysseus' companions have abided by their oath up until the point of their very starvation; they had eaten the provisions they had brought with them in the ship, and after that "they turned to hunting...and went ranging after fish and birds, anything that they could lay their hands on, and with curved hooks, for the hunger was exhausting their stomachs" (330-332). It was in the midst of their desperation that Odysseus was compelled to go and pray to the gods. Eurylochos' desire is not the least bit 'immoderate'; it is only for food, from which comes nourishment and strength to stave off death—not for the pleasure connected to eating, or to eating a certain kind of food. Faced with the absurd situation of starving to death alongside a herd of cattle, the men

finally slaughter some of them. It would seem that what this example actually shows is that the demands of the body *per se* cannot simply be ignored, and that even normally obedient men will disobey under such extreme duress. These are permanent concerns, and so far as they involve real need, they must somehow be met. And at the end of Book Three, Sokrates tacitly acknowledges this fact; for he is careful to provide for all the real material needs of the guardians and auxiliaries so that they will not be roused "to do harm to the other citizens" (416c-e). Furthermore, the pleasure that normally accompanies eating and drinking should not be regarded as subversive *per se*. It is something that may be enjoyed as long as it does not jeopardise control over oneself.

Having given these two examples concerning eating and drinking, Sokrates now turns to discuss sex. He gives one example of the uncontrolled desire for the pleasure of sex and another of the uncontrolled desire for revenge in the case of infidelity. In the first example, Zeus is unwilling to control his lust for his wife, Hera, even so much as to wait until they return home to a more private place, "but wants to have intercourse right there on the ground" (390b). But one suspects that the real relevance of Sokrates' citing it is to remind us that in doing so, Zeus forgets all of his carefully wrought plans for the war between the Achaians and the Trojans. Furthermore, this lustful episode is part of Hera's plot to get Zeus to fall asleep, thereby giving Poseidon the opportunity to assist the Achaians against Zeus' will. Thus, in his inability to rule over his immediate desire for the pleasure of sex with Hera, Zeus gives up the future fulfilment of his carefully wrought plans. Hence, this example also shows that even within the context

of marriage, sexual intemperance remains a problem. Simply because one abides by the lawful institutions of one's polity in regard to these matters, one does not escape all the negative repercussions that can accompany unrestrained indulgence in the pleasure of sex.<sup>31</sup> With this behaviour of the greatest of the gods as an example, these young men would be more inclined to indulge in such pleasures when they could, excusing their own loss of self-control and consequent neglect of their guardianship responsibilities towards the city.<sup>32</sup>

The second example of immoderation pertains to extramarital intercourse. Despite being married to Hephaistos, Aphrodite, the goddess of love, is unwilling to deny the lustful advances of Ares, the god of war. Hephaistos, being informed of their adultery, vengefully traps them in "inextricable bonds" on Aphrodite's bed. In his "savage anger" (*Odyssey*, VIII, 304) he calls all the gods to come witness such infidelity and demands back all of his gifts of courtship.

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<sup>31</sup> In his very perplexing "Essay 30: Of Moderation", Montaigne elaborates: "So, on behalf of theology and philosophy, I want to teach husbands this—if there still are any who are too vehement: that even the pleasures they get in making love to their wives are condemned, unless moderation is observed; and that it is possible to err through licentiousness and debauchery, just as in an illicit affair. Those shameless excesses that our first heat suggests to us in this sport are not only indecently but detrimentally practised on our wives". Montaigne then goes on to give his own account of Zeus and Hera, with some significant variations. (*Essays* I 30 in Donald M. Frame's translation in *The Complete Works of Montaigne*, p. 147.)

<sup>32</sup> In addition, there is a curious aspect to this example. Sokrates chooses to quote the line that refers to Hera and Zeus violating some of the most fundamental norms of sexual conduct. It emphasises their secret (and likely forbidden) sexual intercourse—intercourse not only out of wedlock, but incestuous as well. That such desires are not necessary in the strictest sense, does not mean that they are any less compelling than the desires for food or drink.

In this regard, Montaigne recalls: "It seems to me I once read in Saint Thomas, in a place where he is condemning marriages of relatives within the forbidden degrees, this reason among others, that there is a danger that the affection a man bears to such a wife will be immoderate; for if conjugal love is whole and perfect, as it should be, and you add to it also that which is due kinship, there is no doubt that this increase will carry such a husband beyond the barriers of reason." ("Of Moderation", *op. cit.*)

Once again, the secret indulgence of the pleasures connected with sex, especially with regard to the god of war, must not be admired by young warriors. Neither, however, does the fact that they are caught in the act serve as an adequate deterrent, since as Hermes admits to Apollo, he would eagerly submit to a humiliation greater than this if he could sleep with Aphrodite (339-342). However, what is actually being censored in this example is somewhat ambiguous. For as we saw above, the control of one's spirit is required for moderation also, and so the "savage anger" of Hephaistos may be as much of a concern as the lust of Ares and Aphrodite.

In fact, Sokrates treatment of the problem of sexual intemperance seems to be especially tied to the spirit. Zeus himself emphasises that it is his "spirit" that has been "melted" and broken into submission by Hera's beauty (*Iliad*, XIV, 316). Also, Hephaistos proclaims that although Aphrodite is beautiful, "she is not master of her spirit [*ouk echethymos*]" (VIII, 304). These two examples, then, remind us that the desire for sex is not simply a bodily desire, and further, they suggest that spirit is intimately involved. As the human's desire for the pleasure of sex is not usually as indiscriminate as the beast's desire for the physical pleasure of intercourse with just any female or male (as appropriate), but with someone who is particularly "attractive", the spirit's appreciation of beauty, and its passion to possess it, may be the main problem in sexual intemperance. As we will see, cultivating the spirit's taste for what is fine or beautiful (*kalos*) is a primary goal of the education in music, but restraining its passion must still be the subject of law.



It is curious that in Sokrates' treatment of sexual pleasure, he avoids discussing any higher conception of love. Zeus, Hera, Ares, and Aphrodite appear to be acting out of a more bestial love than any kind of profound affection based upon the appreciation of higher human (much less, divine) qualities. It seems that Sokrates leaves out of his consideration the more rational elements of human love and its expression. It is these qualities that make particular individuals especially attractive—love among human beings can be based on far more than "just a pretty face". However, Sokrates' emphasis upon the pleasures of the body and the passions of the spirit seems to ignore this facet of human love, which can make the desire for a certain individual completely overwhelming, and thus render the very idea of "loving moderately" utterly impractical, despite what one might like to prescribe (cf. 403a).

Sokrates concludes this discussion of moderation for the multitude with an example that does not appear to illustrate either obedience to rulers *or* rule of the pleasures of drink, sex, and eating. Rather, he suggests it demonstrates "endurance by famous men in the face of everything" (390d). Such patient endurance certainly requires self-mastery, something that all these examples show and that underlies all virtue. But this concluding example serves to reveal more of what is involved in ruling the spirit in particular.

After ten years of fighting at Troy and another ten years journeying homeward, Odysseus finds his wife being courted by a group of young men who are immoderate in almost every sense. Disguised as a beggar, he has watched

as his maidservants leave at night to sleep with these suitors. Odysseus is able to quell anger in his spirit, but not without a struggle first:

But the spirit deep in the heart of Odysseus was stirred by this,  
and much he pondered in the division of mind and spirit,  
whether to spring on them and kill each one, or rather  
to let them lie this one more time with the insolent suitors,  
for the last and latest time; but the heart was growling within him.  
(*Odyssey*, XX, 9-13)

Unlike Achilles, whose angered spirit must be restrained by Athena, Odysseus appears to be master of his own spirit. Thus, this initial discussion of the "most important elements of moderation for the multitude" concludes with an example showing the spirit being obedient to rational speech (*logos*). As a result, we might suspect that the rule of one's spirit is at least as important in attaining moderation as is the rule of the pleasures connected to the body. As we shall see, this same example of Odysseus' good behaviour prepares the way for the fuller treatment of moderation in Book Four, where Sokrates returns to it in order to illustrate an important point concerning the inner relationships of the soul's parts.

Sokrates continues his reform of the speech component of the musical education by turning to a discussion of wealth; however, the issue of moderation is still present. He says that "the men mustn't be allowed to be receivers of gifts or lovers of money [literally, lovers of means: *philochrēmatous*]" (390d). That is, they must not be concerned either with the material possessions or with the means of attaining them. Just as wailing and lamentation, laughter, anger, and the pleasures connected to the body can easily corrupt the judgement of these

young men, so too can wealth and what it buys persuade them against what is best for the city. Warriors that are motivated by money and possessions, rather than by love, victory, friendship, and virtue are mere mercenaries and accordingly unreliable. The discussion here points back to what earlier Sokrates and Glaukon agreed concerning love of money: that it is a reproach, and that "the good" are not willing to accept it as a fitting wage for ruling (347b).

Wealth provides the means for pursuing the pleasures connected with the body (580ea), and having both the leisure and the means, it is more difficult to deny the desires for these pleasures when they arise. In fact, money is only introduced into the first city in *logos* to facilitate the acquisition of those things produced for the body (371b-d). This basic connection between the desire for money and the concern for the body suggests that the pursuit of wealth is likely in tension with moderation (cf. 485e), especially when one considers that meeting the needs of the body may be accomplished with a comparatively small amount of money. However, the pursuit of wealth is not simply opposed to moderation, even though in describing the oligarchic regime in Book Eight, the regime devoted to wealth, Sokrates asks: "Isn't it by now plain that it's not possible to honour wealth in a city and at the same time adequately to maintain moderation among the citizens, but one or the other is necessarily neglected?" (555cd). It is important to notice that the focus here is upon "the citizens" rather than the oligarchs who rule. For the former, the pursuit of wealth is likely indicative of licentiousness; in fact, Sokrates asserts that the ruling class in an oligarchy actually encourages excessive expenditures among the rest of the citizenry so

that they "can become richer and more honoured" (555c-d). However, while the citizenry tends towards licentiousness, the ruling oligarchs may be basically moderate as a result of their strict austerity.

However, Sokrates' discussion of oligarchy reveals another dimension to wealth that bears on moderation; that is, the status that accompanies it and the spirit's sensitivity to such status. As Glaukon observes much later, "the wealthy [man] is honoured by many" (582c). Throughout this section on wealth in Book Three, Achilles is the focus of discussion once again. Both the attempts by the Achaian leaders to lure him back to the fighting with gifts and his own acceptance of gifts must be censored. However, such censorship is not undertaken because Achilles uses wealth to over-indulge in the pleasures of the body. Rather, what is most important to Achilles throughout the *Iliad* is his honour, and such gifts are intended both as an indication of how the Achaians honour him and as a source of status in the sight of others as well. However, Sokrates assures us that Achilles is "most moderate [*sôphronestatos*]" (391bc), and that the stories that make him out to be a lover of money and arrogantly disdainful of both gods and human beings are false, since these are "two diseases that are opposite to one another" (391c). It seems that what makes these two diseases opposites is that the first indicates that one accepts and cherishes the honour of human beings that accompanies wealth, while the second would indicate an indifference, or even contempt, for both human beings and gods. That is, one cannot rationally be at once a lover of honour and yet contemptuous of those who bestow it. And, insofar, as one's craving for status can compel one to act as

immoderately as one who is consumed by their bodily desires, wealth, or status generally, is as much an issue in moderation (cf. 550e). This dimension of wealth suggests the importance of the spirit—once again—as an obstacle to becoming moderate. It is likely that because wealth has these kinds of connections to the spirit and the pleasures of the body that Sokrates eliminates the use of silver and gold by the warrior class along with almost all other private property, declaring that wealth is the primary source of faction between citizens (417ab, 422ea; cf. 373e).

Moderation, then, as this first discussion of it emphasises, requires obedience to rulers, which presupposes (whatever else) self-control of basic bodily desires. For most people this is arguably the greatest problem connected to moderation, for the concerns of the body tend to be the main the focus of their attention. Mastering these concerns, or having them mastered with the "assistance" of others (e.g., through police enforcement), is necessary in order to engage in the activities of a normal life. It seems that the first step in such self-mastery is diminishing one's respect for the pleasures of the body. These reforms in the speech component of the education help to do this by instilling such salutary beliefs. To this extent, the problem that these potential warriors confront in becoming moderate is a problem for everyone; and thus, this *is* a description of moderation for "the multitude".

However, this description serves as a point of departure for a finer treatment of moderation. What we have seen from a closer consideration of Sokrates' examples, is that the spirit can compound the difficulties involved in be-



coming moderate. Restraining the passions of the spirit is an essential component of the obedience required in moderation. As the education being prescribed here is first of all for young men whose first quality of soul is great-spiritedness, this must be particularly true for them. But, it is not obvious that obedience to rulers should be an essential aspect, or even the most important aspect, of moderation *per se*. Rather, the self-control involved in ruling the bodily desires is more akin to our common-sense conception. However, Sokrates has not yet offered either a definition or anything purporting to be a comprehensive account of moderation; he has discussed only what appear to be the "most important elements" of it. Both Sokrates and Adeimantos have been working with an implicit understanding of this virtue. They have been speaking about what one must do to *act* moderately so that they might reform the traditional education with that goal in mind, employing examples of good and bad words and deeds. Nevertheless, this emphasis upon obedience to rulers can be shown to coincide with the more common-sense conception. As we shall see, Sokrates' introduction is particularly useful, since it suggests a process by which moderation can be attained.

Customary conceptions of moderation suggest that it requires self-discipline in reference to some principles of behaviour. The principles to which the warriors of the city in *logos* are to subscribe are established implicitly by their education, through tales of gods and heroes who set good examples. With an eye towards their attaining the self-discipline necessary to moderation, these young would-be warriors require the consistent enforcement of the established

norms of behaviour, especially before they have the ability to grasp the principles themselves. This is similar to guard dogs who are trained to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate behaviour based upon punishment and reward—which for warriors would be primarily praise and blame (to which their spirited natures are especially sensitive). As a result, those who cannot yet determine for themselves the right principles of how to speak and act, obey the examples established by the rulers. Gradually, such obedience itself accustoms the warriors to restraining their passions and desires. In this way, obedience to rulers can be an initial stage in acquiring moderation. However, there is no one to discipline these spirited young men once they have become the city's warriors, for they constitute both police and army. While the expectations of their fellow-warriors would provide strong "peer pressure" for each to act appropriately, only the knowledge of the principles of moderation and their underlying rationale would allow them to determine for themselves what behaviour is appropriate for any given circumstance. While being nurtured on examples of good words and deeds may be the first step towards learning the implicit principles, such good examples cannot sufficiently address every conceivable circumstance that these warriors will confront. Therefore, it seems that the principles implicit in the examples, or some effective equivalent, must eventually be learned. Neither the speech component of the musical education nor its other three components provides the warriors with a rational understanding of such principles. However, the education as a whole does inculcate within them a consistent, unified taste. Having developed such taste, they can speak and act

in accordance with it, rather than relying solely upon a limited number of examples. Throughout the rest of these reforms in the musical education, we will see how style, harmonic mode, and rhythm contribute to this end.

After reforming the speech component of the musical education, upon which far the most time is spent, Sokrates and Adeimantos consider the style. The focus is upon whether the poets and the guardians will use narration, imitation, or a mixture in their narratives. First, they decide upon the style appropriate to the guardians. It appears that they will use a mixed style, imitating the speeches and deeds of a "good man," and "most when he is acting steadily and prudently; less, and less willingly, when he's unsteadied by diseases, loves, drink, or some other misfortune" (396cd). For portraying these latter things as well as for portraying other kinds of men, he will use narration. The only exception would seem to be when he is describing an inferior man doing something good, or when he is playfully imitating inferior people. Earlier, Sokrates gave the details of what the guardians may imitate: "if they do imitate, they must imitate what's appropriate to them from childhood: [men] who are courageous, moderate, holy, free, and everything of the sort" (395c). These are the kinds of civic virtue that are being instilled by the education as a whole, and that the speech component in particular encourages. Regarding style, however, the concern is not primarily the content of the speeches or the goodness of their deeds, but the *manner* in which they communicate the speeches and deeds of others. And for the guardians, the issue is not the effectiveness of their communication, but what effect the style they use has upon their souls. Imitation, Sok-

rates says, gives "a taste for the being" (395cd). Apparently, descriptions in the third person that compose simple narrative do not have this same effect. In narration, one only describes the speeches and deeds of others, while in imitation one tries to liken oneself to the person being described. In fact, to make a convincing imitation one must liken oneself as closely as possible to his subject, in some cases actually engaging in the very same speeches and deeds. Thus, imitation brings the speaker much closer to experiencing the things that he is attempting to communicate, and along with that experience may come the associated thoughts, pleasures, pains, desires, and fears.<sup>33</sup> The effect of such imitation upon one's "habits and nature" may be very similar to the effects of engaging in the speeches and deeds themselves, "especially if they are practised continually from youth onwards" (395d). In addition, there is also a danger that imitation will cultivate a "sympathetic appreciation" for what *should* be an *alien* way of life to these would-be guardians. This is similar to the treatment of lamentation discussed above, where it was better that these young men should "laugh scornfully" at such things rather than take them seriously. Thus, it appears

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<sup>33</sup> It is worth noting that there may be a difference between the effect produced in oneself when imitating someone's speeches as opposed to imitating their deeds. It seems to be the case that imitating speeches has a different effect upon one's soul, especially upon the rational part of the soul, insofar as imitating someone's speeches seems to involve one more intimately in the experience of thinking their thoughts. In fact, it is often the "internal logic"—that the speech makes sense to us—that helps us to remember it. In contrast, the relationship between imitating someone's deeds and experiencing their same pleasures, pains, desires, and fears does not seem as necessary or as immediate. For example, simply acting like a child does not necessarily entail feeling what a child feels; however, memorising the speeches of one of Shakespeare's characters would seem to require one to think his thoughts to some considerable extent. Contrary to what Sokrates initially suggests, one may liken oneself to someone else in *thought* as well as "in voice or in looks" (cf. 393c with 395d). In fact, the former ability is essential for the activity of philosophy. Sokrates, however, emphasises the public examples that one sets through what one says and does.

to be at least as important that potential warriors only imitate the speeches and deeds of "good men" as it is that they hear the right tales about gods, demons, heroes, and Hades' domain. With respect to moderation in particular, they must imitate only the speeches and deeds of moderate men when they are acting moderately. By imitating such men, they will become accustomed to the self-discipline involved in ruling their passions and desires. As all virtue must be learned, perhaps the first step in acquiring any virtue is simply to imitate those who manifest it. In fact, imitation is one of the earliest ways in which children learn. In order to become basically moderate in the behavioural sense, then, it is unnecessary to form a coherent conception of moderation and to be able to defend its goodness; one need only imitate those who are obedient to the rulers and who are themselves rulers of the pleasures of drink, sex, and eating. As a result, moderation is likely to "become established as habits and nature, in body and sounds and in thought" (395d). In contrast, immoderate speeches and deeds may only be narrated, not imitated, by them.

Again, there would seem to be another hidden purpose to this treatment of whether the guardians of the city will be imitators or not. Both Glaukon and Adeimantos had made it clear in their challenges that the ability of human beings to dissemble was a foremost concern for justice. The height of injustice presumes the ability to always *appear* just, which involves a skill in acting. However, the guardians of the city in *logos* are to be kept unskilled in concealing what they really are; that is, there should be no discrepancy between how they appear to others and what they are like in reality. These men are to be in reality



just what they appear to be—skilled guardians of the city. Thus, this first part of the treatment of imitation seems to be a direct response to the initial challenge presented by Glaukon and Adeimantos.

This issue of what the guardians may imitate helps to determine the outcome of a second issue—what style the poets of the city may use. Sokrates allows Adeimantos to make this selection; he chooses "the unmixed imitator of the decent" (397d). By this formulation the poets would only be allowed to portray good men saying and doing good things, and only through imitation. They would not even be allowed to describe worse men through narration. As a result, the most powerful stories—those of good triumphing over evil—would be impossible to construct.<sup>34</sup> However, Sokrates subtly revises Adeimantos' choice before concluding this section. He relaxes Adeimantos' restriction enormously by allowing poets "who would imitate the *style* of the decent [man]" (398ab). For the purposes of the present discussion, the *style* used by the decent man and the decent man himself must be clearly distinguished. The decent man's style is that allotted to the guardians—the imitation of good men doing good things *and* narration of everything else. Thus, Sokrates allows the narration of worse men and deeds back into the city. This allows for a more "pleasing" style (397d) that provides more compelling tales to tell to their youth. However, it is

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<sup>34</sup> It would seem that Adeimantos is quite attracted to the austerity of the regime they are constructing, and with the careful education in civic virtue that is being prescribed. Hence, he chooses a *simple*, unmixed style pertaining to the speeches and deeds of the decent man. However, the fact that he chooses imitation over narration is more puzzling. It may be that his love of the imitative forms of poetry, particularly tragedy and comedy (394b,d), moves him to retain some part of them. However, as noted above, his choice effectively eliminates some of the most compelling pieces of poetry, and likely all of tragedy and most of comedy.

also important to understand why imitation is more prominent than narration throughout this section on the poets' style.

Imitation appears to be the more powerful manner of communication for most people. For example, Sokrates chooses imitation with only a small amount of narration to retell the entire story of the *Republic* to some anonymous comrade. Furthermore, Plato practises unmixed imitation in writing all the dialogues; that is, he presents either a dialogue between various characters (e.g., *Krito*), or he has one character recount a past conversation (e.g., *Republic*), or both (e.g., *Symposium*)—nowhere does Plato himself simply narrate.<sup>35</sup> Imitation seems to captivate more readily the power of the imagination. It explicitly invites the listener to imagine that the dialogue is actually taking place in his presence, often involving him in filling in details that are required but only suggested by the dialogue. As a result, it seems easier to place oneself within the story. Thus, just as the act of imitation brings one closer to the actual experience, so too does listening to imitative poetry bring one more readily to that experience.<sup>36</sup> In terms of the education of these young men, then, poetic imitation more readily provides them with a taste of the experience of virtue and habituates them to it.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> For a thoughtful, and thought-provoking, treatment of Plato's style and what it conveys to his reader, see Leo Strauss' "On Plato's *Republic*" in *The City and Man*, pp. 50-62 especially.

<sup>36</sup> This is not to say that simple narrative is always less effective than imitation. It does however seem to require more *initiative* on behalf of the reader to place oneself in the story and to come close to the experiences presented there. To that extent, the reader of narratives may be required to have an even more vivid imagination. But this, then, restricts the most powerful effects of narration to such people.

<sup>37</sup> Until this point, the extent to which this reformed education is supplied to the rest of the citizens of the city in *logos* is unclear. The education was introduced specifically for the young men who would become the city's warriors, and the speech component seems to be tailored to fit their particular task. However, this discussion of style suggests

The second half of music, that which "concerns the manner of song and melody", is taken up next. Sokrates suggests that these matters must be in accord with the models of speech and style that they have already laid down, and that consequently "everyone" could "by now discover what we have to say about how they must be" (398c). Glaukon, however, refuses to allow Sokrates to pass over this third part of music, and he becomes Sokrates' interlocutor for the remainder of the educational reforms, for the selection of the rulers, the noble lie, and the establishment of the communal military camp of the guardians at the end of Book Three. Glaukon's request that they not skip over any part of the argument has a close analogue in Book Four. When Sokrates suggests that they might skip over moderation and proceed directly to justice, after having found wisdom and courage, Glaukon objects again. He refuses to allow Sokrates to pass over this third virtue, and again Sokrates obliges him. Furthermore, there, in briefly comparing moderation to wisdom and courage, Sokrates suggests that "it is more like a kind of accord and *harmony*" (430e; cf. 431e-a). The similarity of these two parts of the dialogue may suggest that the selection of the correct harmonic modes plays an especially important role in engendering the "harmony" that he later explicitly associates with moderation. This suspicion is supported by the conclusion to this discussion of harmonic mode. Having selected two modes and three instruments to go with them, Sokrates swears, "by

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that the entire citizenry would have the benefit of being educated in the same civic virtues as the guardians, insofar as the only poets allowed into the city are those who "imitate the style of the decent [man]". Thus examples of men who are "courageous, moderate, holy, free, and everything of the sort" would always be presented in a style that is most compelling for most people. In contrast, vice would be portrayed only through narration.

the dog...unawares we've again purged [purified; *kathairontes*] the city that a while ago we said was luxurious." Thus, the city is luxuriated with the introduction of certain refined foods and eating arrangements, followed by a host of "unnecessary" arts, and it is mostly purified when the unrestrained melodic accompaniments and their associated instruments are purged from the city. As Glaukon notes, all this is a sign of their moderation (399e). Therefore, it seems essential to consider how harmonic mode in particular can help to engender moderation.<sup>38</sup>

Sokrates suggests that melody is composed of speech, harmonic mode, and rhythm. As speech that is sung must follow the same models for the speeches that are spoken, they turn to consider the melodic accompaniment, or harmonic mode, next. In commenting on their discussion, we will first outline the actual reforms that are made, and then return and examine them more closely. As the harmonic mode, as well as the rhythm, are to follow the speech, they eliminate those modes that imitate wailing and lamentation along with those that are "soft and suitable for symposia" (398e). This appears to leave two modes that are useful to the city. The first is a "violent" [forceful, compulsory:

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<sup>38</sup> Such a correspondence between this part of the education and the search for the four virtues in the city arises again when they move on to consider the fourth part of the educational reforms, that is, rhythm. Sokrates hands over the responsibility to Glaukon, but Glaukon can't discern the appropriate "rhythms of an orderly and courageous life" (399e). Similarly, in Book Four when they finally turn to track down the fourth virtue in the city, justice, Sokrates again suggests that Glaukon take up the lead and again Glaukon states his inability to do so. These similarities in dramatic action suggest that there is some sort of connection between the four parts of the reform of the musical education and the four cardinal virtues in the city in Book Four. If so, then the discussion of speech would seem to correspond to wisdom and that of style to courage. While the speech component of music appears to have an obvious relationship to wisdom, the more difficult pair seems to be style and courage.

*biaios*] one that "would appropriately imitate the sounds and accents of a [man] who is courageous in warlike deeds and every violent work" and who in the face of disaster "stands up firmly and patiently against chance" (399ab). The second is a voluntary [willing; *hekousios*] mode for the one who "performs a peaceful deed" and who acts "moderately and in measure". This second mode imitates a person who is "persuading someone and making a request" as well as when he holds "himself in check for someone else who makes a request or instructs him or persuades him to change" (399bc). Having identified these two modes, they remove all the panharmonic instruments out of the city (and the craftsmen who make them as well), leaving two instruments that are useful for the city and one for the country.

The main concern in all of these reforms appears to be that the manner of song and melody can effectively "imitate" the whole range of human experiences. The sense in which this is so is easily demonstrated by the modern movie soundtrack. Harmonic dissonance usually accompanies unpleasant or frightening scenes while simple harmonic consonance accompanies pleasant scenes. In addition, the tempo of the music can help to regulate the level of excitement, whether the scene is romantic or terrifying. Abrupt changes from one mode to another, or from one extreme in pitch to another, can draw one's concentrated attention. While such manipulations of music may simply enhance a scene as it proceeds, they often *precede* the scene and *prepare* the audience for it. In fact, music can even encourage a "letting go" of oneself; that is, it can slacken one's self-control (e.g., "rock and roll"). Understanding



precisely *how* music produces these effects within the human soul is not required to recognise that melodic accompaniment and rhythm may be important considerations in the education of youth. With musical modes that imitate only good dispositions, undesirable behaviours are not represented anywhere in the city in *logos* and cannot be imitated. In fact, it would seem that not only individual dispositions but the character of entire nations may be represented in music, insofar as certain kinds of music are named after and thought to be representative of their nation of origin (cf. 398e-a).

In addition, they remove all the panharmonic instruments presumably because they are now unnecessary, and similarly with the craftsmen who make them. However, this seemingly obvious and minor step also ensures that there will be no means by which to experiment with the other modes. Innovation in melodic accompaniment, then, is effectively eliminated. The need for such strict censure will become more apparent as our analysis of the treatment of harmonic mode and rhythm continues.

In this city in *logos*, only the two modes mentioned above remain. Socrates specifically removed those modes that imitate human beings who cannot restrain themselves. The mentions of drunkenness, softness, and symposia recall the concern with ruling the pleasures connected with the body, and of course the voluntary mode is specifically said to be suitable for one who is acting moderately. In addition, this voluntary mode is to imitate one who is "holding himself in check for someone who makes a request or instructs him or persuades him to change", which seems to correspond well to the obedience to rulers re-

quired in moderation for the multitude. Moreover, the forceful mode also has elements that are akin to moderate behaviour. While this mode is to imitate "one who is courageous in warlike deeds and every violent work", it is also said to suit the one who in the face of disaster "stands up firmly and patiently against chance." In this regard, we might recall the quiet obedience of the Achaian army entering into battle, the example of Odysseus' patient endurance that concluded the discussion of moderation for the multitude, or even the assertion that a decent man "laments least and bears it most gently when...misfortune overtakes him", such as the death of a son (387e). That both modes may help to engender moderation suggests that they are not as different from one another as they appear at first. In concluding his description of them, Sokrates blends all of their characteristics into a single list: "These two modes—violent and voluntary, which will produce the finest imitation of the sounds of unsuccessful, successful, moderate, and courageous ones—leave these" (399c). In fact, these modes are fundamentally similar insofar as they are both regular, strong, and steady, without sharp variations or abrupt changes. To that extent, both modes contribute to the stable characters of these potential warriors, which is required if their moderation and courage are to be reliable.

However, melodic accompaniment is particularly useful in instilling moderation and courage because melody is able to have an effect upon the soul that is neither entirely conscious nor rational. Insofar as moderation is concerned with rule of the passions, pleasures, and desires, and courage is concerned with rule of the pains and fears, some or all of which may be sub-rational

(insofar as they originate in some part of the soul other than the rational part), music may be particularly effective in reaching these other parts and in inculcating virtue there. Conversely, it may also prepare the way for vice. Note that it was Glaukon, whom Sokrates explicitly says is "musical" (398de), who was the cause of most of the luxuries being brought into the city in the first place. The effect of this part of music is discussed further in the next section on rhythm.

The final purgation of traditional music is accomplished with the reforms in rhythm. They seek the rhythms of an "orderly and courageous life" only, but neither Glaukon nor Sokrates appears to be able to identify exactly what these would be. Instead, Sokrates suggests that they'll "consult with Damon"; Sokrates' authority on musical matters (400b). Thus, while they have an appreciation of the influence of rhythm upon the soul and a fairly clear conception of what effect they would like to achieve in their city in *logos*, they lack the technical knowledge to be able to achieve their aims. This seems to reveal part of the proper relationship between the specific, technical knowledge of the various individual arts and the kind of comprehensive knowledge required in the art of rule. It is not the case that the person who would be a fit ruler must have such precise knowledge of the particular kinds of metrical feet and which sorts of life each imitates. Rather, the art of rule requires that one have an understanding of the "meta-musical" questions, such that one has a clear notion of the desired results and can seek out and employ the person who has the more specific, technical knowledge that is required. Accordingly, instead of a positive recommendation, Sokrates suggests that they are seeking to identify and eliminate

those rhythms which are "appropriate for illiberality and insolence or madness and the rest of vice" (400b). It seems that rhythm, too, can imitate various human activities and dispositions. Hence, providing for some rhythms and prohibiting others may also help to engender certain good habits and qualities of soul. As not only madness, but also insolence [*hybris*] is contrary to moderation (e.g., 390a; 402e-a), it may be that certain other rhythms may imitate, and thus help to instil (either directly or indirectly), obedience to rulers and rule of the pleasures connected to the body. It is likely that such rhythms would again be regular and steady, and that the tempo would be uniform and neither too quick nor too slow.

Despite the brevity of their treatment of rhythm, Sokrates' summation of the musical education suggests that harmonic mode and rhythm determine the character of the entire rearing of a child. The reforms in speech, style, melodic accompaniment, and rhythm all combine to produce a "good and fair disposition"; that is, one that is marked by "grace" (*decorum*; *decency*; *elegance*; *euschēmosynē*; 400ea). Insofar as grace and gracelessness may be manifest throughout the city and throughout nature (401a), all the city's craftsmen must "impress the image of the good disposition" upon the products of their craft. In this way the citizens will be steeped in all that is "fine and graceful" from youth onwards, and such things will become instilled in their habits and even cultivate in them a taste for such things. Apparently, what contributes most to this process are the last two components of the musical education (i.e., the aspects of music they discussed *least*):

rhythm and harmony most of all insinuate themselves into the inmost part of the soul and most vigorously lay hold of it in bringing grace with them; and they make a [man] graceful if he is correctly reared, if not, the opposite. Furthermore, it is sovereign because the [man] properly reared on rhythm and harmony would have the sharpest sense for what's been left out and what isn't a fine [*kalos*] product of craft or what isn't a fine [*kalos*] product of nature. And, due to his having the right kind of dislikes, he would praise the fine [*kalos*] things; and, taking pleasure in them and receiving them into his soul, he would be reared on them and become a gentleman. (401d-a)

While the kinds of harmonic modes and rhythms are determined by the speech and the style, they have the greatest effect upon youthful souls. Through their power, which can shape the irrational or sub-rational parts of the soul, they make rearing in music "most sovereign" (401d).<sup>39</sup> Consequently, bad music would help to engender bad habits and eventually bad natures; and, these would be most difficult to reform later in life. Perhaps Damon is more correct than is commonly thought: "never are the ways [characters; *tropoi*] of music moved without the greatest political laws being moved" (424c).

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<sup>39</sup> Nietzsche's discussion of music in *Twilight of the Idols* seems to support these conclusions and adds to the treatment given here:

Music, as we understand it today, is also a total excitement and a total discharge of the affects, but even so only the remnant of a much fuller world of expression of the affects, a mere residue of the Dionysian histrionicism. To make music possible as a separate art, a number of senses, especially the muscle sense, have been immobilised (at least relatively, for to a certain degree all rhythm still appeals to our muscles); so that man no longer bodily imitates and represents everything he feels. Nevertheless, that is really the normal Dionysian state, at least the original state." ("Skirmishes of an Untimely Man", in Walter Kaufmann's translation in *The Portable Nietzsche*, p. 520.)

This also suggests why rhythm receives the briefest treatment and harmonic mode the next briefest. For, as these components of music can have their greatest influence upon the irrational or sub-rational parts of the soul, no amount of discussion could possibly make up for the actual experience. In contrast, the speech component is discussed the most. In this respect, the dialogue imitates the phenomena.



Before taking up the second half of the traditional education—that is, gymnastic—Sokrates concludes the musical education with a discussion of love (*erōs*). He says that the kind of musical man that is produced by this reformed music will most love those human beings with fine dispositions. However, such love must not lead to sexual intercourse. He concludes by saying that “surely musical matters should end in love matters that concern the fair [fine; noble; beautiful; *kalos*]" (403c). It would seem that because this entire musical education has instilled certain tastes in these young men, they also come to love that which accords with their taste. Thus, they will love everything in the city that is graceful and harmonious like themselves, from its architecture and dress to this musical education itself and the human beings educated by it. As a result, they will be particularly concerned to preserve and perpetuate the city as it is first arranged, including its reformed education. This seems to provide part of an answer to the problem of the guardians' natural savageness to each other and the rest of the citizens—they will come to think of the city as their own and come to love it as well.

However, their love for all that is in accord with these “fine dispositions” is not unproblematic. Their spirit has been educated and trained to take pleasure in objects that are akin to this beautiful disposition, but its resulting passions have not been eradicated. Consequently, their love for other human beings with such a disposition in their souls is still apt to arouse the desire for union with them in whatever ways are possible. That such intense love would lead to sexual intercourse is not unlikely, and the fact that it must simply be *legislated* against

(403b) suggests that this is not only likely, but an altogether natural response—despite Sokrates' suggestion that "the naturally right kind of love is to love moderately and musically what is orderly and fine" (403a). Furthermore, sexual activity among those with such good dispositions cannot go without restraint, since this is the very kind of excessive pleasure said to be incompatible with moderation (402e). This reveals that their love for the noble or beautiful (*kalos*) in the city—those things that the education has taught them to love—could after all subvert everything they have learned about self-mastery and moderation. Thus, a tension still exists between the rational and sub-rational parts of their souls. The education has instilled salutary opinions in these young men, and in addition, their spirits have been trained to appreciate certain fine, beautiful, or noble things. But their primal urges still pull them in another direction. The fact that what they will love about another person is the similarity of these salutary beliefs and the strength of will to resist such primal urges, would seem to make the attraction and the resulting desire all that much more intense. Thus, to this point in the dialogue, this basic tension in the human soul has not been adequately addressed. Hence, legislation is employed in lieu of any better solution.

The second part of the traditional education consists of gymnastic. However, because "a good soul provides the body with its own virtue so as to make it as good as it can be", Sokrates and Glaukon agree that it would be sufficient to show "the way only to the models" of gymnastic education and leave the "precise details" to the intellect, which presumably has been provided for adequately (403d-e). As gymnastic is later said to oversee "growth and decay in

the body" (521e), one would expect here a discussion of nourishment, exercise, and rest. However, what follows is a much more lengthy discussion of the art of judging, the art of medicine, and the experiential background of their respective practitioners. Thus one might suspect that the way to the models is actually somehow revealed in their discussion of these two arts. Despite their modest plans to show the way to these models only, they conclude by actually setting down *laws* providing for both the art of medicine and the art of judging. These arts "will care for those...citizens who have good natures in body and soul; while as for those who haven't, they'll let die the ones whose bodies are such, and the ones whose souls have bad natures and are incurable, they'll kill themselves" (409ea). Overlooking the difficulties in such laws for now, it is evident from this comparison between the art of judging and the art of medicine that something analogous corresponds to the two parts of the traditional education. The "best gymnastic" is said to be akin to the "simple music" that they have just finished describing. Sokrates suggests that "just as simplicity in music produced moderation in souls..., in gymnastic [it produces] health in bodies" (404e). Similarly, "just as refinement [in music] gave birth to licentiousness", in gymnastic it gives birth to physical illness. And, just as the problems caused by licentiousness are taken care of by judges in the law courts, physical illnesses are taken care of by doctors in hospitals. Further consideration of some of the details of this parallel between the relationship of music and gymnastic (on the one hand) and between the art of judging and the art of medicine (on the other) will contribute to our examination of moderation.

First, Sokrates emphasises relationships among their simple music, moderation, and the art of judging. The simplicity of the reformed music (including speech, style, and melodic and rhythmic accompaniment) is said to be conducive to moderation. Sokrates suggests that this music is simple in that it hasn't allowed all kinds of "refinement" [diversity, complexity—literally, "many-coloured"; *poikilia*]. Hence, it has not produced conflicting beliefs, habits, and tastes in these potential warrior-guardians. As a result, these young men are also simple, possessing a harmonious set of civic virtues that preserves the "city's freedom" (395c). More specifically, though, Sokrates emphasises that it is the "melodies and songs written in the panharmonic mode and with all rhythms" that produce licentiousness (404d-e). It seems to be the austerity of the melodic accompaniment and the rhythms in particular that help to engender moderation.

Second, moderation is once again linked with justice. As this reformed musical education is to engender moderation in particular, there may be little need for the judge's art and hence for judges, at least among the warrior-guardians (410a; cf. 464d-b; 410b). Sokrates seems to agree with Adeimantos that much of the problem of justice in polities is due to the licentiousness of its citizenry. This connection between moderation and justice becomes even closer in Book Four.

As gymnastic is later said to be primarily for the soul, and only incidentally for the body (410a), it may be that this discussion of gymnastic, health, and medicine also has some bearing upon how moderation is engendered in souls.

Sokrates asserts that "these combatants in war...must be sleepless like hounds, see and hear as sharply as possible, and in their campaigns undergo many changes of water, food, the sun's heat, and winds without being too highly tuned in health" (404ab). However, after roasted meats are chosen over boiled meats and fish, and sweets are eliminated altogether, the discussion turns to the arts of judging and medicine. What is subtly emphasised throughout this section is that "excessive care of the body" is a hindrance throughout one's life. "But most of all," Sokrates emphasises, "is that it also makes any kind of learning, thought, or meditation by oneself hard; it is always on the lookout for tensions and spinning in the head and holds philosophy to blame. So that wherever virtue is practised and made to undergo scrutiny in this way, this care of the body is in every way a hindrance. It always makes one suppose he's sick and never cease to take pains about his body" (407bc; cf. 455b). While the pleasures and pains connected to the body are an impediment to virtue generally, moderation and courage in particular seem to address this problem. Insofar as moderation entails rule over the pleasures connected with the body and courage entails rule over its pains, a proper gymnastic would contribute to the acquisition of both of these virtues. It would promote self-mastery by accustoming both body and soul to enduring suffering. And as these virtues help to free one from the concerns of the body, they also help to lay a foundation for virtue generally. Thus, it would seem that the focus on reforming medicine throughout this section supposedly about gymnastic is justified by the fact that medicine has become an art that is actually devoted to the alleviation of physical suffering rather than



to the promotion of health (406a). Its focus is too much on the body and its pains—sophisticated medicine in effect encourages hypochondria, and discourages self-sufficiency. In this way, this reform of medicine may indeed serve as an indication of the manner in which the rest of gymnastic must be reformed.

Having provided this framework for hunting down the other models pertinent to gymnastic, Sokrates turns to give an overview of the entire education as it is now reformed. Rather than the conventional view with which they began (i.e., "gymnastic for bodies and music for the soul"; 376e), music and gymnastic are now agreed to be "established both chiefly for the soul" (410c). As evidence for this assertion, Sokrates notes that an education in gymnastic without music produces "savageness and hardness", while an education in music without gymnastic produces excessive "softness and tameness". This returns to the original problem of the warrior's nature, and suggests that a solution may be found in this reformed education. Having selected great-spirited natures, but realising that such natures would make these men "savage" to everyone, it was agreed that they needed to learn to differentiate their own and those known to them from their enemies, and then behave accordingly: being gentle to the former and cruel to the latter. Thus, these potential warriors needed to be educated. Now Sokrates suggests that if "rightly trained" the spirited part of their nature would be "courageous", and if "finely reared" the rational part of their nature would be "tame and orderly" (410d-e). These two must be harmonised with one another and "the soul of the [man] thus harmonised is moderate and courageous" (410ea). It seems then that this reformed education in music and

gymnastic has been directed at properly educating each of these two parts of their natures, as well as harmonising them with one another; and, instilling moderation and courage has been its primary goal. However, as Sokrates continues, it becomes clear that this is accomplished primarily through the proper education of the *spirit*; since both music and gymnastic are directed towards the spirit first of all.

Music is said to charm the spirit so that it would be "softened like iron and made useful from having been useless and hard" (411ab). Music, when properly employed, does not make the spirit soft and passive, but rather amenable to being ruled. The effect of gymnastic is also predominately on the spirit. It arouses the spirit; and, such a man is "filled with high thought and spirit, and...become[s] braver than himself" (411c; cf. 410b). Furthermore, Sokrates notes that when gymnastic is pursued without any music, the result is the withering of the part of the soul that is directed towards learning and investigation. Left unchecked, such a man "no longer makes any use of persuasion by means of speech but goes about everything with force and savageness, like a wild beast; and he lives ignorantly and awkwardly and without rhythm or grace" (411de). Thus, neither music nor gymnastic is said explicitly to be a direct benefit to the rational part of their nature; but, this part *is* benefited nonetheless. First, this education ensures that it is not overwhelmed and weakened by the excessive savageness of the spirit. More importantly, however, the gymnastic component may toughen the rational part by forcing it to exert itself and by accustoming it to enduring the suffering of the body (441ea). In this way, it is taught

not to give excessive 'respect' to pain, and hence, the bodily concerns will not pose as much of an obstacle to it (cf. 407bc). Thus, the rational part of their nature is not entirely neglected; indeed, it couldn't be. For if the spirit is to become obedient to the rational part, they must be trained together. The spirit will not learn such obedience in the abstract, but rather through experience and practice. Hence, the rational part must participate in its training and be doing its work as well.

However, the salutary beliefs that the education instills do not truly awaken and train this part of the soul. In fact, Sokrates expressly notes that this education is effective *before* they are "able to grasp reasonable speech" (402a). Thus, these young men are virtuous through the good habits in which they have been reared. They do not possess a rational understanding of what moderation is, for example, or why it is good. Rather, they have experienced moderation in their deeds and "know" it to be good as a result of that experience, and on the authority (including the example) of those who rule them. As Glaukon observes just before the second explicit educational program in the *Republic* is outlined (an education that is to turn their souls from the shadows of their cave-like existence and draw it "from becoming to being"), this first education in Books Two and Three "educated the guardians through habits, transmitting by harmony a certain harmoniousness, not knowledge, and by rhythm a certain rhythmicalness. And connected with it were certain other habits, akin to these, conveyed by speeches, whether they were tales or speeches of a truer sort. But as for a study directed towards something of the sort you are now seeking, there was

nothing of the kind in it" (522ab). Sokrates wholeheartedly agrees. Thus, the education of the spirit seems to be the primary focus of this first pedagogic enterprise. Appropriately, we have seen that the rule of the spirit is a primary concern in moderation. Not only must the pleasures connected with the body be ruled adequately, but so must the passions and desires of the spirit.

In contrast, the young men with whom Sokrates is constructing this city in *logos* are beginning to develop a rational understanding of what moderation is and why it is good. In addition to whatever experience they have in being moderate, this imaginative endeavour has taught them both how moderation is instilled in youth and why it is good in a city. However, this does not yet respond to the attack on moderation made in Glaukon's and Adeimantos' challenges. Such a rational defence of moderation, that it is good in itself for the individual man, is developed more fully later in the *Republic*, beginning in Book Four.

Moderation, then is one of two civic virtues that this first educational scheme is meant to engender. First of all, it involves mastery of the pleasures connected to the body. Of particular concern are the pleasures of drink, sex, and eating, which accompany activities that constitute a substantial part of human life. As a result, the desires for these pleasures are prevalent and powerful. A first step towards moderation is reducing such concern for the body. In addition, only through being able to obey oneself is it possible to obey someone else willingly. However, such obedience also requires one to rule the passions of the spirit, as the examples from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* reveal. The human spirit can pose as much of a problem to becoming moderate as the pleasures

connected to the body. Our examination of moderation so far has also shown both that it is particularly difficult for youth to acquire, and that the acquisition of wealth is intimately related to the indulgence of the body and its associated pleasures as well as to the desire of the spirit for status. In addition, not only madness and licentiousness, but also insolence are opposed to moderation, suggesting the need for self-control generally. However, as Sokrates will point out in Book Four, "self-control" and "self-mastery" are paradoxical terms. In unravelling this paradox, Sokrates broadens the conception of moderation, and provides a more comprehensive view of this virtue.



### Chapter Three: Political Moderation

Our desire to understand what moderation is, as treated in the *Republic*, has led us to follow the desire of Glaukon and Adeimantos to understand what *justice* is in the human soul and why it is good. Their investigation with Sokrates involved the construction of a city in *logos*, with a separate class of warriors that required a suitable education. The primary goal of that education is to instil civic virtue in these great-spirited young men, particularly, courage and moderation. The conception of moderation introduced in Book Three, however, is qualified as moderation "for the multitude". This leaves open the possibility that a more refined conception of moderation remains to be discovered. Book Four furthers our understanding of this virtue by defining it first in terms of the city and then in terms of the soul. Sokrates will introduce and emphasise the "accord and harmony" that moderation produces in each. Understanding what kind of accord and harmony this is, and how it is produced, is the beginning of a finer conception of moderation. However, as the discussion proceeds, moderation and justice seem to become increasingly similar to one another. The effort involved in our clearly *distinguishing* them will help to refine still further our understanding of moderation. Before delving into the search for virtue in the completed city, however, it will prove helpful to summarise how the city is brought to its completion after the warriors' education has been finished.

Upon the completion of the education for the young potential warriors, Sokrates immediately raises the question of who ought to rule. The selection of

the rulers is established upon three basic criteria, though only two are specified. The first, and unexpressed, criterion is that the city's rulers will come from this group of warriors and nowhere else. Second, the rulers are to be older than the ruled. And third, "they must be the best among them" (412c). What is meant by "best" is further specified in terms of their prudence and power in guarding the city, as well as by their "care" for the city. Only this last issue is given special attention. On the assumption that one cares most for what is one's own, the guardians would be those who identify their own good with the good of the city as closely as possible. Their skill at guarding this conviction—that they must always do what seems best for their city—is tested thoroughly from childhood onwards. With leaders or "overseers" having been distinguished from the warrior class in general, there are now three classes in the city: these "complete guardians", their "auxiliaries", and the "working" or "producing" class of farmers and artisans. However, the city's unity, and in particular the preservation of this ordering of ruler and ruled, appears to be in need of additional support.

Sokrates suggests that they contrive "some one noble lie" to bolster the preservation of the city as they have now ordered it. This "lie" may be divided into two parts. The first attempts to persuade them that they are all "brothers and born of the earth"; that is, that they all share the bond of kinship in common and that "they must plan for and defend" the land in which they abide as if it were their mother and nurse (414e). The second part, however, is no longer called a lie [*pseudos*], but rather a tale or myth [*mythos*], and hence we may presume that it contains some truth (cf. 377a). Its primary purpose seems to be

to preserve the order of rule in the city through instilling what has come to be called "the Myth of the Metals". If possible, everyone must be convinced that "the god" has determined who is competent to rule and who should be in each of the other classes in the city. It is also to be believed that the god provided a means by which human beings, and in particular the guardians, could recognise and honour the various ranks of souls that belong to each class (i.e., in accordance with which of the four metals is mixed in at each person's birth). Furthermore, they are to believe that "there is an oracle that the city will be destroyed" when a person from the class of farmers and artisans becomes its ruler (415b). One might concede that the rearing of succeeding generations in the noble lie from childhood might partly account for their convictions in these matters, but the fact that it should even be required casts a shadow upon the adequacy of the education they have just completed. While on the one hand both parts of the noble lie help to make the lowest class (which presumably does not receive this education) acquiesce in the city as it has been arranged, on the other hand, the noble lie is contrived first of all to help make the guardians and auxiliaries care for the citizens as if they were family and for their land as if it were their mother (cf. 414d). And, one would have thought that the education in music would have instilled the necessary salutary opinions and formed their taste in a way that caused them to love the city as their own. But even the noble lie is not sufficient for this; their material living arrangements and possessions must be strictly regulated as well. They are to be placed in a military camp in which there is neither privacy nor private property, and they are to receive

meals (of which they partake communally) as their wages. These arrangements are made so that all their real needs having been met, they are less likely to become "like savage masters instead of well-meaning allies" (416b). Again, these provisions seem to call into question the adequacy of their education. Moreover, Sokrates explicitly asks at this point: "And wouldn't they have been provided with the greatest safeguard if they have been really finely educated?" Glaukon replies, "But they have been." However, Sokrates cautions him: "It's not fit to be too sure about that, my dear Glaukon." (416b). As it turns out, the education they have described is not the best or highest of which human beings may partake, and so these great-spirited young warriors may not yet have "what's most important for being tame with each other and those who are guarded by them" (416c). The original problem of the warriors' nature, then, has not been perfectly dealt with up to this point. The right education, however, is agreed to be the key to resolving this problem. The second educational program, the revolutionary pre-philosophic education given in Book Seven, may be presumed to provide whatever is lacking in this first civic education. But, insofar as they have been seeking to instill moderation and courage through this first education, Sokrates' guarded warning makes it doubtful that they have actually been profoundly and entirely successful in doing so. In particular, the understandings of moderation and courage *per se* provided so far may be superficial. Indeed, later Sokrates will insist that: "even for these very virtues it won't do to look at a *sketch*, as we did a while ago, but their most perfect elaboration must not be stinted" (504d). However, Adeimantos shows no awareness of these possibilities at this

point. Instead, he interrupts with an objection concerning the likely lack of *happiness* that such arrangements entail for the guardians and auxiliaries.

Adeimantos is concerned that these guardians and auxiliaries are more like mercenaries than citizens since they don't receive the good things that the city has to offer. Adeimantos is not so much troubled by the simplicity of their lives or the austerity that is demanded of them—he had no objection to the simple, austere way of life in the so-called "city of pigs". Rather, his list of good things that these guardians will lack indicates his special interest in the status and honour that typically accompany the possession and consumption of wealth. As a result, he concludes, the very ones who rule the city are not happy. Sokrates' "apology", that as founders they ought be more concerned about the happiness of the city as a whole rather than of any particular part, leads into a discussion of the problems posed by the existence of both wealth and poverty in the city. The guardians are to ensure "that these things never slip into the city without their awareness" (421e). Adeimantos seems to agree in principle, but he still has a reservation about the ability of their city to make war when it doesn't possess any money, especially if it must fight against a wealthy one. Sokrates assures him that this is more of an advantage than a disadvantage, since it makes their warriors like "solid, lean dogs" rather than "fat and tender sheep" (422d). In addition, they will use the lure of the wealth of their enemies to secure allies for themselves. Adeimantos, however, is still concerned about one city accumulating enormous wealth and the threat that they would be able to pose to a poor one. In his response, Sokrates outlines the tactics they will use to cre-



ate faction among their enemies; that is, by inflaming the factionalism that naturally is always at least potentially present between the rich and the poor in virtually every polity. However, Sokrates also transforms Adeimantos' concern into a question of the unity of a "city"; that is, into a question of the true measure of political greatness. And, it is said to be the city in *logos*—as long as it "is moderately governed in the way it was just arranged"—that will be "truly greatest", since it will always be a single whole. The guardians, then, are "to guard in every way against the city's being little or seemingly big; rather it should be sufficient and one" (423c). Sokrates claims that the guardians will be able to watch over all these things and those that went before, as well as find the correct arrangements for everything else on their own, if "they guard the one great—or, rather than great, sufficient—thing"; that is, their education and rearing (423de). In this way, "the regime, once well started, will roll on like a circle in its growth. For sound rearing and education, when they are preserved, produce good natures; and sound natures, in their turn receiving such an education, grow up still better than those before them" (424a). If the guardians preserve the musical component of their education in particular, they will be able to find the appropriate social conventions and proper arrangements for managing economic matters and other social practices. It will even be unnecessary to make legislation concerning each of these things, since good judgement in such matters will follow naturally from the good education they receive. In contrast, laws alone cannot correct those who are licentious due to poor rearing and education, just as those who are ill due to "their worthless way of life" will

not believe "the [man] who tells the truth—namely, that until one gives up drinking, stuffing oneself, sex and idleness, there will be no help for one in drugs, burning, or cutting, nor in charms, pendants, or anything of the sort" (425e-b). This, however, suggests that moderation is best established while one is still young, since once licentious habits are established they are very difficult to break, so much so that becoming moderate after a self-indulgent childhood is very unlikely. And, one may agree that battling such licentious passions, desires, and pleasures one by one as they arise is likely to be useless and accomplish nothing (cf. 427a). It would seem, then, that acquiring such virtue later in life requires a comprehensive re-education.<sup>40</sup>

Sokrates concludes the legislation for the city on the same note as the education began: with matters having to do with the gods. It is puzzling, however, that while "the greatest, fairest, and first of the laws" are said to be those which pertain to their religious practices (427b), Sokrates tells us nothing about them except that they will abide by the ancestral. However, upon reflection this is a sensible conclusion, since as Adeimantos notes in his challenge, knowledge of the gods and what they require of human beings is received "from nowhere else than the laws and the poets" (365e). Consequently, if the authority of the

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<sup>40</sup> It may be that a closer study of the re-education of these young men with whom Sokrates is conversing would reveal how this might be done, but such a study is outside the scope of the present analysis. Furthermore, there may even be a fourth education worth considering in the *Republic*; that is, the education that one attains for oneself through a careful study of the dialogue. For a further discussion of the pedagogic potential of this dialogue, one might refer to Leon Harold Craig's, "The Four-Fold Education of Plato's *Republic*" (forthcoming), as well as the "Prologue" of *The War Lover* (op. cit.).

laws pertaining to religious practices is to remain intact, it would be best to leave their origins buried in the past.

Having completed the last details of this third city in *logos* (or, alternatively conceived, third stage in their city in *logos*), Sokrates and the others are able to turn more directly towards finding an answer to their original question. Assuming that their city has been "correctly founded" and is therefore "perfectly good", they are now in a position to see justice (and apparently all other virtues) writ large in it (427e). Once having discovered it there, they may be better able to discern what justice is in the soul. To facilitate their quest, Sokrates suggests a systematic approach that would be helpful in the event that the justice of the city is not immediately apparent. He suggests that "just as with any other four things, if we are seeking any one of them in something or other and recognised it first, that would be enough for us; but if we recognised the other three first, this would also suffice for the recognition of the thing looked for. For plainly it couldn't be anything but what's left over" (428a). Since justice does *not* immediately come clearly into view, they attempt to find the other three virtues first. However, we should notice that their approach assumes that virtue may be divided into different parts in the first place, and moreover, that they already know how *many* parts. In contrast, when they come to consider the human soul, they must determine whether it has parts at all, and if so, how many they will need to distinguish, and how they will be able to separate them clearly from one another. The fact that they neglect to raise such issues in the case of virtue makes their approach here somewhat suspicious. In addition, it is not clear how one ought

properly to conceive of the virtue of a *city*, as opposed to that of a human being. With regard to this last issue, briefly examining Sokrates' discussion of wisdom and courage will help us to see some of the alternative possibilities, and in turn these will help us to understand the treatment given to moderation.

Contrary to what one might expect, the city's "wisdom" is supposedly the most conspicuous of its four virtues, and yet Sokrates observes that "something about it looks strange" (428ab). What he has in mind is not clear. He suggests that a city as a whole may be called wise "because it's of good counsel" (428b). It is agreed that this is a kind of knowledge and that it resides in the guardians. Hence, the city as a whole is wise due to this kind of knowledge that "ought to be called wisdom" which is possessed by one of its parts. What Sokrates appears to find strange is that a whole city might be called wise due to the wisdom of one of its parts, and of the smallest part at that.<sup>41</sup> This emphasises the peculiarity of what they are doing. They have assumed that a city could, and ought to, manifest the same four cardinal virtues that would be manifested by a good human being. But precisely because these virtues properly apply to hu-

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<sup>41</sup> It is implicit that the city would be wise only if those who possess this "wisdom" actually rule in it. Thus, the rule of the wise is prefigured here. However, these "perfect guardians" are far from philosopher kings. They were certainly not selected for their wisdom; rather, the third criterion in their selection—that they were to be "the best of the guardians"—emphasised their ability to be skilful guardians "of their conviction [*dogmatos*] that they must do what on each occasion seems best for the city" (413c). Such dogmatism was to be tested in a variety of ways, but the most telling tests would be those that revealed the *truth* to them—that their own good is in fact *not* identical with the city's. For example, the loss of a child, being crippled in battle, or enjoying the pleasure of sex does not have the same repercussions upon the city's good as it does upon their own. Certainly, philosophers—literally, lovers of wisdom—are not those who dogmatically retain such convictions when confronted with the truth. Thus, the city is wise in part because of the *unyielding convictions* of the guardians. Perhaps, for this reason too, the city's wisdom "looks strange".

man beings, it is not clear how they may be applied to a city as a whole. Perhaps the most obvious possibility is that a city may be called virtuous in some way because *everyone* in it manifests that virtue. But, this is not the case with wisdom; the whole city is said to be wise because of the knowledge of the smallest part within it. However, because this part rules, it does seem sensible to claim, as Sokrates does on behalf of their city, that the ruling part gives the whole city its character in this respect. Thus, a second way that a city might be said to be virtuous is due to the virtue of its rulers. However, this conception is not consistently employed with respect to the other virtues. A third alternative is that a city may be called virtuous if some part of it, not necessarily the ruling part, manifests that virtue. Insofar as a certain virtue is particularly relevant to the task performed by a certain part of the city, if the individuals that perform that task manifest that virtue, then perhaps the city as a whole may be said to display it. This seems to be the approach taken with courage.

As courage is particularly relevant to the art of war, the part of the city "that defends it and takes the field on its behalf" ought to display it (429b). The courage of the individual warriors, then, determines the city's courageousness. Thus, the city again manifests a virtue due to one of its parts. In contrast to the treatment of wisdom, Sokrates and Glaukon discover *who* makes the city courageous before they determine *what* it is that constitutes the city's courage. That is, Sokrates begins with what might be the most obvious aspect of each virtue. In the case of wisdom, what constituted a city's wisdom was more obvious than who in the city displayed it. In the case of courage, who ought to display it is far

more obvious than what it is. In fact, the attribute of the soldiers that makes the city courageous is peculiar, so peculiar that Glaukon seems to be surprised and perplexed. Whereas wisdom is a certain kind of knowledge, courage is a certain power [ability; strength; *dynamis*], the "power that through everything will preserve the opinion about which things are terrible—that they are the same ones and of the same sort as those the lawgiver transmitted in the education" (429bc). Some of these opinions were discussed at the beginning of Book Three with regard to the beliefs about death and Hades. While those opinions were said to contribute to their courage, here their courage is said to be defined by the power to preserve them and perhaps others (e.g., that wealth and poverty must not be allowed into the city; and that there must not be any kind of innovation in their education, especially in music; 423de; 424d). To help relieve Glaukon's perplexity, Sokrates offers an image to illustrate it: that of dying wool.

The dying process that Sokrates describes, however, applies to the entire education in music and gymnastic, not just to the instilling of beliefs about "what's terrible" but "about everything else" as well (429ea). If the souls of the young men are properly prepared and educated, their opinions will be "colourfast" and will not be "washed out" by "pleasure...pain, fear, and desire" (430ab). This is true both in terms of their courage and their moderation. And, pleasures and desires prove to be an obstacle to their courage in addition to pains and fears. Similarly, pains and fears pose an obstacle to their moderation as well as certain pleasures and desires. All of these things are capable of dislodging one's opinions and may cause their virtue to be "washed out and ridicu-



lous" (429e; cf. 413c-a). Having explained courage in this way, however, Sokrates places an explicit qualification upon it—this is to be accepted as "political courage"; a "still finer treatment" is expressly reserved for later. Similarly, one suspects then, the treatment of wisdom that preceded this account ought to be viewed as "political wisdom".<sup>42</sup> With this in mind, one may suspect as well, that the treatment of moderation that follows should be regarded as *political* moderation. There is a higher conception of each that is revealed after Book Four, apparently interwoven with the discussion of philosophy.

Moderation appears to be different from these first two virtues and it causes Sokrates and Glaukon to pause in their search for justice. Whereas wisdom "comes plainly to light" (428b) and courage "isn't very hard to see" (429a), moderation in the city seems to be particularly difficult to discover (cf. 432b-c). In fact, it and justice will both need to be pursued by their "tracks" (430e; 432d).<sup>43</sup> Confronted with having to recognise the city's moderation next, Sokrates asks, "How could we find justice so we won't have to bother about moderation any further?" (430d). This question is especially peculiar, since Sokrates had taken the trouble to formulate an explicit approach for finding justice—one that would entail finding moderation first. As this approach is threatened by

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<sup>42</sup> Cf. footnote 41.

<sup>43</sup> This is the central of the seven uses of the word "tracks" or "to track" in the *Republic*. These uses suggest that *logos* (rational speech or argument) provide the tracks of ideas (cf. 365d, 410b), and that following them is akin to hunting (410b, 432b-d). Even popular linguistic usage may be helpful in such a hunt, as is the case here with moderation. As Bloom notes, the hunt is "a frequent analogon of philosophy in Socratic discourse" (*The Republic of Plato*, note 17, p. 456).

Sokrates' question when he turns to consider moderation, it may be useful to examine it and the assumptions that underlie it.

The approach had provided a means for finding a specific member of a set of a known size. If one could find all the other members of the set first, then the remaining one would be the one that was sought. This assumes at least three things. First, one must know the number of discrete items in the set. In terms of the quest for virtue, they must be sure that there are four and only four virtues, so that finding three of them would leave one remaining. As a corollary, they must know that none of the virtues is subsumed by another; for example, that justice is not subsumed by moderation. Second, this approach assumes that whatever it is in which the search is being conducted, it actually contains the entire set of things that are to be found. Sokrates and the others must know that the city actually contains these four virtues. This was agreed upon (but without sufficient proof) when Sokrates suggested that *if* they have founded the city *correctly* it is "perfectly good", and therefore "wise, courageous, moderate and just" (427e). Third, this approach assumes that all but the last element may be recognised, and more readily, in some *other* way. While one suspects that they will make use of their opinions about the first three virtues, this approach gives no indication of how they will be found (i.e., recognised).<sup>44</sup> With these as-

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<sup>44</sup> Their procedure tacitly suggests that opinion must serve as the point of departure for political philosophy. One must assume that, to some extent at least, some of one's opinions are related to the truth of things. In the case of justice, however, the question has been raised by Glaukon and Adeimantos whether all the opinions about it are wrong—that there may not be anything *real* to which the opinions correspond. This radical doubt is not applied to the other virtues. In the case of wisdom, courage, and moderation, they are content to rely upon their opinions; that is, there is some agreement that they exist, that there is something that corresponds to their opinions. Where

sumptions made explicit, it is now possible to examine Sokrates' suggestion that they might depart from this approach when they arrive at moderation.

Sokrates' suggestion may be understood in at least three different ways, each involving one of the three assumptions outlined above. First, moderation may not belong to the set of relevant virtues at all, leaving only three virtues; in which case, justice would now be what's left over. However, four distinct virtues are repeatedly identified and treated throughout the *Republic*. Second, it is possible that moderation is not present as a virtue of the *city*, even in one that is correctly founded. Perhaps moderation cannot be properly applied to a city, but only to an individual. However, the fact that in ordinary speech we distinguish some regimes as more moderate than others, and that Sokrates is able to give a plausible account of moderation in the city suggests that this is an inadequate explanation as well. If, instead, one assumes that Sokrates' suggestion of skipping moderation is not a violation of their approach, then a third possibility suggests itself. If moderation is somehow different in kind from the other two virtues and not immediately identifiable, then it may require an altogether different approach than the one they have used to find the first two virtues. It may even require a different conception of how a city may manifest a virtue. This third possibility seems worthy of further consideration.

Until now the virtues have been discussed in terms of the individual person, and the city is said to be virtuous because of the virtue of the individuals

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justice is concerned, however, they want to get *beyond* opinions somehow. Sokrates' approach to this problem is meant to show (among other things) that these other three virtues are not sufficient, that one still needs justice for a complete conception of virtue.

composing certain parts. So, one might expect that since the city is wise due to the wisdom of its rulers, and courageous due to the courage of its auxiliaries, it would be moderate due to the moderation of those who compose the third class—the farmers and artisans. However, this option is not explored, perhaps suggesting that such a notion is simply unrealistic. For this class in the city, the accumulation of wealth is the primary motivation: they are the only ones who are allowed to possess money (417ab), it constitutes their wages (unlike the guardians and auxiliaries; 420a), and later it is suggested that "love of money" is the disposition in the soul that corresponds to this class (435e-a). But, as we saw in the case of Kephalos, money-makers like himself are not seeking to accumulate a "moderate" amount of wealth, but rather as much as they can get. And, even if "moderately" successful, this is far more than what is required to meet the needs of the body, and it suggests that moderation is unlikely to be the *characteristic* virtue of this class of people. Furthermore, although it turns out that all of the citizens are in fact moderate in some sense, that is *not* why the city is *called* moderate. Thus, the hunt for moderation requires yet another conception of how a city can manifest a virtue. However, this fourth conception requires a more involved explanation, and so Sokrates may have paused here for what is first of all a rhetorical purpose—to gain Glaukon's approval for a more extended explanation of this third virtue. This is also suggested by the terms that Sokrates chooses to phrase his proposal. The verb "to bother with" [*pragmateuomai*] can also mean "to treat laboriously". Glaukon's insistence that they do not skip over moderation, however, gives Sokrates leave to treat it more systematically and at

greater length.<sup>45</sup> It seems unlikely that Sokrates ever actually intended to skip over moderation.

Nevertheless, in some way Sokrates' suggestion could be considered a plausible alternative. Actually *skipping* moderation would thwart their search for justice *unless* moderation and justice share so much in common that finding justice would practically suffice for finding moderation. From Sokrates' first mention of "soundness of mind" in the counter-example he presents to Kephalos, and the first mention of "moderation" by Adeimantos, moderation and justice have been frequently paired together. And as Kephalos, Glaukon, and Adeimantos seem tacitly to agree, the bodily desires are among the principal causes of injustice in most men. Consequently, moderating these desires may go a long way towards achieving justice in a city. When one considers the self-discipline entailed, which involves the control of the spirit and its passions as well as the appetites, acquiring moderation may practically suffice for much of the ordinary work of justice. Although moderation and justice will prove not to be equivalent, Sokrates' suggestion is another reminder of the close kinship between them.

The exchange between Sokrates and Glaukon that immediately follows the suggestion that moderation be skipped altogether reveals one more sub-

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<sup>45</sup> Yet another aspect of this suggested violation of their established approach seems to be pertinent. In some sense, this may be a test of Glaukon's self-mastery. His will at this point to suppress the gratification of his hunger and thirst and perhaps other bodily desires with which Polemarchos and Adeimantos had originally enticed him is tested by Sokrates' suggestion that they might take a short-cut to finding justice. Glaukon's insistence that they give a full treatment to moderation is another indication of his mastery over his bodily desires. And, more importantly, it is an indication that Glaukon's interest in moderation has been growing. Whereas Sokrates first took it up in detail with Adeimantos, now Glaukon desires to hear more.



tlety regarding this virtue. We should recall that, for Glaukon, moderation does not appear to be the most attractive of virtues. As noted previously, he ignores it in his challenge, but would likely attack it as "unnatural", violating what he regards as the most basic principle of life: "having more". Furthermore, he shows his fondness for the pleasures associated with the body in his rejection of the first city and in his request for greater luxury. As well, his view of moderation seems to be revealed in part in his response to Sokrates' claim that they had purified the formerly luxurious city after having reformed the harmonic modes and eliminated the unnecessary instruments. Glaukon's response—that this is a sign of their moderation—indicates that moderation, in his mind, entails not only self-restraint but the removal of some of the most enjoyable things in life (399e). Here, however, Sokrates suggests that not all the desires for things that are enjoyable need be restrained or eliminated for one to be moderate; namely, Glaukon's insistence that his desire to *know* be "gratified" is not resisted by Sokrates. In fact, Sokrates is *eager* to gratify it, "so as not to do an injustice" (430e). This suggests that moderation does not require the restraining of *all* pleasures and desires equally. This is also suggested in Sokrates' preliminary definition that "moderation...is surely a certain kind of order and mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires" (430e). Evidently, not all pleasures and desires are included here. It may even be that some pleasures, particularly those having to do with the pursuit of certain kinds of knowledge may be pursued without any



danger due to excess.<sup>46</sup> So, it is only after this peculiar but revealing interlude that the discussion of moderation in the city now proceeds.

Sokrates returns to a consideration of moderation by contrasting it with wisdom and courage. He mysteriously suggests, "Seen from here, it's more like a kind of accord and harmony than the previous ones" (430e). While the perspective from which Sokrates makes this statement is obscure at best, it nevertheless suggests that the city cannot be described as moderate due simply to the moderation of the individuals that compose one of its parts. Instead, it must be described in terms of some relationship among the parts or among all the citizens. This seems somewhat paradoxical, for, of all the virtues attributed to the city so far, moderation would seem to be the one that applies most obviously to its individuals. Instead, Sokrates suggests that it is precisely this one that must be considered in terms of its relational properties. However, as soon as he turns to

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<sup>46</sup> This notion is discussed in the three proofs that the life of the kingly man is better than that of the tyrannic man in Book Nine (cf. 586d especially).

Montaigne appears to disagree vehemently with this view. He argues that any virtue may be practised to excess:

I like temperate and moderate natures. Immoderation, even in the direction of the good, if it does not offend me, astonishes me and gives me trouble to name it.... And I like neither to advise nor to follow a virtue so savage and costly.

The archer who overshoots the target misses as much as the one who does not reach it. And my eyes trouble me as much when I raise them suddenly to a strong light as when I drop them into the shadow. Callicles, in Plato, says that the extremity of philosophy is harmful, and advises us not to plunge into it beyond the limits of profit; that, taken with moderation, it is pleasant and advantageous, but that in the end it makes a man wild and vicious, disdainful of common religions and laws, an enemy of social intercourse, and enemy of human pleasures, incapable of any political administration and of helping others or himself, fit to be slapped with impunity. He speaks truly, for in its excess it enslaves our natural freedom and, by importunate subtlety, leads us astray from the fine and level road that nature has traced for us. ("Of Moderation", *op. cit.*; cf. 487b-d)

explain what he means by his opening statement, Sokrates *does* retreat to a conception that applies to the individual: "Moderation...is surely a certain kind of order and mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires, as [men] say when they use—I don't know in what way—the phrase 'stronger than himself'" (430e). Hunting down moderation in the city entails that they correctly interpret the meaning of this particular linguistic "track". In doing so, however, they have *reversed* the original analogy between the city and the man. In their search for moderation in the city they are explicitly pursuing an understanding of it in the individual, so that they may in turn apply it to the city; but, when later they come to look for virtue in the individual person, they then apply it back to the soul. This apparently circular procedure makes the usefulness of the original analogy questionable in this case.

Before following Sokrates and Glaukon as they interpret the meaning of this "track" on the trail to moderation, Sokrates' preliminary indication of moderation as "a certain kind of order and mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires" is worth some comparison with the earlier "moderation for the multitude". That moderation involved a kind of mastery of oneself was implicit in the discussion in Book Three; however, the emphasis upon order (*kosmos*) is new.<sup>47</sup> Not only are certain kinds of pleasures and desires within the city to be mastered, but they are to be ordered, that is, rank ordered. And, if people may be distinguished according to their characteristic kinds of desires and pleasures,

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<sup>47</sup> In the Greek, order is clearly emphasised, as the sentence begins with *kosmos*. In contrast, mastery [*egkrateia*] is the last word of the phrase, with pleasures and desires in-between.

then there is a tacit rank-ordering of people as well. Second, moderation now explicitly pertains to *both* pleasures and desires. The kinds of pleasures involved we are already familiar with; however, the kinds of desires remain unspecified. At the very least, they would include the desires for the pleasures of drink, sex, and eating; but not every desire is for a corresponding pleasure, as Eurylochos' hunger and Hephaistos' anger revealed. For example, one can desire the good for its own sake, apart from any pleasure that accompanies it. In addition, the rule of one's desires is more perplexing. While pleasures do not arise apart from engaging in a particular activity, many desires seem to arise spontaneously. The difficulty is not that all desires are completely unpredictable, but that to some extent they do arise without warning. For example, one can predict roughly when one will be hungry, but one cannot anticipate the precise moment, and further, sometimes it is impossible to predict what particular kind of food one will have an appetite for, especially in the case of so-called "cravings". Furthermore, when suddenly confronted with a dish that "looks good", we often desire it whether or not we are hungry, and we note how such things are "appetising". To a certain extent, the spontaneity of one's desires might be akin to that of one's memories. Sometimes we remember certain things whether they are directly connected to what we are thinking or doing or not. And even when there is a traceable path of associations to that memory, it is not obvious that this is the only memory that fits those associations, or that any particular association *necessarily* follows from the previous one. Hence, it seems far more difficult to prevent a desire from arising than the experience of a pleasure, and it is not clear how

such desires in the city are ruled. Sokrates begins to answer such questions through the linguistic analysis that follows.

Sokrates claims that the phrase "stronger than himself" is 'ridiculous', but none the less it appears amenable to a plausible psycho-logical explanation. He suggests that this phrase, taken from ordinary usage, is laughable because the implied subject and the object seem to be conflated: the same "one" is both the "stronger" and the "weaker". To make sense of the phrase, there needs to be a subject that is clearly distinguishable from the object, so that the one may be "mastered" by the other. Yet, as the same human being appears to be referred to, this phrase implies some kind of division in the soul, such that one part (or parts) of the soul may master the other(s). In addition, the phrase seems to praise such mastery, which implies that one part is recognised to be better than the other as well. Sokrates' linguistic analysis here reveals "at least three very important facts about our tacit self-understanding: first, that we already implicitly recognise that our souls do, in some sense, have more than one part (or facet, or dimension, or some such thing); second, that these parts have a natural hierarchical order, with one part being better than the other(s) in that it is naturally *better suited to rule* one's whole self; and third, that we each of us 'identify' more closely with that naturally better part—that this is one's 'essential' or 'true' self; only when *this* part is *in fact* ruling am 'I' in control".<sup>48</sup> Thus, Sokrates' explanation suggests that to be moderate one must have the naturally better part of oneself ruling. It is not clear that this is sufficient for moderation, however,

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<sup>48</sup> Craig, p. 95.

for all Sokrates says is that a person in whom it is not ruling is called licentious. Furthermore, Sokrates adds that the better part is smaller than the worse, which he refers to as the 'inferior multitude'. Although he has not explicitly distinguished particular parts of the soul at this point, nor does he state what the better and smaller part is, our own experience suggests that we never speak of ourselves as being in control when our passions and desires are ruling. Rather, it is precisely when these are ruling that we are "out of control". In contrast, it is when the rational part or facet of ourselves rules that we think of ourselves as in control, and it is this part with which we identify our "selves". Compared to the "multitude" of passions and desires, then, the rational part does seem quantitatively "smaller". And this seems correct for another reason: it is the rule of one's rational part over one's passions and desires that is involved in moderation.

Armed with this understanding, Sokrates turns to apply it to the city. If indeed "that in which the better part rules over the worse must be called moderate and 'stronger than itself'", then Sokrates concludes that their city in *logos* may also be 'justly designated stronger than itself' (431b). This is because the city is properly ordered, with the best of the warriors becoming guardians who rule over the auxiliaries, and who together rule over the farmers and artisans.

Having understood what this phrase seems to mean when applied both to the soul and to the city, Sokrates now connects it back to his preliminary definition of moderation, that of ordering and mastering certain kinds of pleasures and desires. Within the city there are many diverse ones, those in "children, women, domestics [house-servants; *oiketai*], and in those who are called free



among the common many" (431bc). The latter group would include most *men* in a democracy. However, there are also "the simple and moderate [measured; *metrios*]" pleasures and desires of the few, those "born with the best natures and best educated" (431c). In the city in *logos*, the latter rule over the former, and so "the desires in the common many are mastered by the desires and the prudence in the more decent few" (431cd). There seems to be several ways to understand this. First, the desires of all the citizens in the city may be similar in kind but different in intensity. For example, the education of the guardians and auxiliaries sought to train them to be masters of certain desires of the spirit and pleasures connected to the body, so that they would be less likely to harm the citizens and each other. With such desires in themselves kept under control, they are better able to police these same desires in the rest of the citizens. Second, there may be a difference in the *kinds* of desires that are present in each class as well. For example, the guardians and auxiliaries were also educated in a way that would cause them to desire to care for the city as they would for themselves—to love it as they would love that which is their own. Thus, these better kinds of desires also effectively rule the desires of the farmers and artisans insofar as the guardians and auxiliaries provide good examples and police everyone else. In addition, those who rule may effectively determine what is honoured and esteemed in a polity, and this may influence the desires of those who are ruled as well. To some extent, then, all of these alternative explanations may apply to the city in *logos*—there are both differing intensities of desires among the classes, as well as different kinds of desires. Either way, the

desires in the city are effectively rank-ordered in accordance with the arrangement of the classes. However, this also suggests that each class of people in the city may be defined according to their characteristic desires; that is, what constitutes their principle motivation. This is discussed more explicitly later, when Sokrates begins to examine whether the three "forms" that are in the city are also in the soul. At this point, and given the order and mastery of the diverse desires in the city by the more decent few, Sokrates concludes that their city could be called stronger than itself (if any is) and perhaps moderate as well.

Having determined what this phrase means and how it applies to their city, Sokrates abruptly adds that 'if there is any city in which the rulers and the ruled have the same opinion about who should rule, then it's this one' (431e). He continues by suggesting that they seemed to have been correct in their initial assertion that "moderation is like a kind of harmony", for 'we would quite rightly claim that this unanimity is moderation, an accord of worse and better, according to nature, as to which must rule in the city and in each one' (432a). However, how it is that this original "track" of ordinary linguistic usage has led to this conclusion is not immediately apparent.

The connection between Sokrates' analysis of the phrase "stronger than himself" and the unanimity of opinion about who should rule (which turns out to be moderation in the city) is not obvious. It is clear how the rule of the better over the worse applies to the moderation of the city—the desires of the more decent few rule over the desires of everyone else through convention, legislation, and its enforcement. That is, the moderation of the city is policed. How-

ever, this itself does not amount to the unanimity of opinion to which Sokrates refers. It is true, though, that the citizens of the city in *logos* would likely agree on the question of who is to rule. In the first place, everyone can comprehend that this arrangement is better than some others, insofar as they recognise that there are many of their fellow citizens who are simply incompetent to rule and others who would make ineffective warriors. However, such agreement would seem to be secured conclusively through the noble lie, and in particular, through the Myth of the Metals. To repeat, this myth was intended to convince everyone in the city that "the god" had determined who was competent to rule and who should be in each of the other classes in the city. It was also to be believed that He provided a means by which human beings, and the guardians in particular, would recognise and honour the various ranks of souls that belong to each class. Furthermore, they were to believe that "there is an oracle that the city will be destroyed" when a person with the wrong nature becomes its ruler (415b). Thus, the citizens are persuaded and compelled by fear into agreement about who should rule. This is what undergirds the unanimity in the city that "the better should rule over the worse", and it is because of such unanimity that the city is properly designated as "stronger than itself". But the myth does not specify who *substantially* the "better" are, except in the circular sense that they are the ones who are suited to rule. What it does is ratify the view that there *is* a hierarchy and that those suited to rule are the very few (rare, like gold). Given *that*, one can presume most people would agree that it's the few prudent, moderate, and brave who are "the better". Hence, the desires of these few better citizens

are able to master those worse ones in the multitude in large part because of the order established and maintained through the Myth of the Metals.

More generally, however, such sameness of opinion on this issue is indispensable in healthy political life. Those who are ruled will either obey willingly or unwillingly. Thus, the ruler may use different kinds and combinations of persuasion and force to procure obedience to the laws (cf. 519ea). However, insofar as the few better people in a city rule over the rest, relying only upon force will not always be successful. The strength in sheer numbers is a considerable political force itself.<sup>49</sup> Thus, there must be some basic level of agreement in any healthy polity about who is to rule, and the grounds of their right to do so. It may depend in part upon deception, as in the Myth of the Metals, and it will almost certainly be bolstered by the occasional use of force, but a peaceful agreement remains essential to almost any regime.<sup>50</sup>

Thus, the consideration of this ordinary phrase, "stronger than himself", places the focus upon a certain kind of ruling relationship in the city, which in turn directs attention to how this relationship is established and maintained. And

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<sup>49</sup> A demonstration of this reality is given at the very outset of the dialogue. Polemarchos (whose name means "War-Ruler") and his troop of young men track down Sokrates and Glaukon and attempt to compel them to return to Piraeus. Polemarchos' attempt to rule over them is based upon numerical strength. Sokrates recognises this kind of power, but he immediately presents the other alternative—persuasion. Adeimantos, however, chooses that alternative; and with the help of Polemarchos, he manages to persuade Glaukon at least. Nevertheless, had Polemarchos been serious about using it, physical force would more than likely have decided the question in favour of the more numerous party from the lower city.

<sup>50</sup> The tyrannic regime would seem to be the most likely exception, since rule is mostly by threat of force. It might also be noted that in this case there is no way in which the better could be conceived of as ruling over the worse, despite the fact that the few, or the one, still rules over the many. Nevertheless, it is also the case that there can be much popular support for tyrannic regimes (cf. 586a-d).

as we have seen, moderation in the city is due to a combination of persuasion and compulsion. To the extent that the multitude cannot master their own pleasures and desires, they are policed by the auxiliaries who can. Yet, some amount of agreement about who is to rule underlies it. It is essential to notice, however, that the final definition of moderation does not itself precisely determine who in the regime ought to rule (cf. 433c). It is only suggested that insofar as a moderate regime is "stronger than itself", the better (and usually smaller) part must rule over the rest. But as we will consider next, there may in fact be several different ways in which these criteria may be met, generating the question, "which way is best?", or which is the *just* way.

In his conclusion to moderation in the city, Sokrates returns to the initial notion that it is a kind of harmony. Insofar as moderation secures the agreement among the rulers and the ruled in a polity about who ought to rule and about the grounds for their right to do so, it *would* seem to result in a basic harmony in political life. However, this implies that the root cause of *political immoderation* is the struggle for power; that is, for political supremacy. In this sense, any regime could be said to be moderate in which who rules, and the grounds for their right to do so, are firmly established. Indeed, Sokrates reveals that the harmony he describes *can* exist in a variety of regimes. He says that moderation "actually stretches throughout the whole, from top to bottom of the entire scale, making the weaker, the stronger and those in the middle—whether you wish to view them as such in terms of prudence, or, if you wish, in terms of strength, or multitude, money or anything else whatsoever of the sort—sing the same chant to-



gether" (432a). If we stop to consider the possible combinations that Sokrates suggests here, there appears to be four different regimes that correspond to each one of these four kinds of strength. And, it may be that each of these regimes is basically, or minimally, moderate. The regime in which prudence prevails appears to correspond to the aristocracy that has just been described. That in which strength prevails would correspond to what is later called "timocracy"; where the multitude prevails, democracy; and where wealth prevails, oligarchy. Each of these regimes may be moderate so long as practically everyone agrees as to what entitles one to rule. With such agreement among the classes, the pleasures and desires of the agreed-upon "stronger", will master those of the rest of the citizens in the ways discussed above. The obvious omission is tyranny, suggesting that there is no stable accord among the parts about which should rule. In addition, in all of these regimes except democracy, the few in some sense rule over the multitude, and to that extent each of these regimes could be called "stronger than itself". This may indicate that the moderation of the democratic regime is a particular problem.<sup>51</sup>

Finally, at the very close of this section Sokrates slips in one more detail. Moderation is this kind of accord "as to which must rule in the city *and in each one*" (432a). This invites us to compare this entire account of moderation within the city with that of moderation in the soul. Before we can do this, however, we must see that the city and the soul are structured in the same way. After they

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<sup>51</sup> This is also indicated by the fact that within all of Book Eight, moderation is discussed exclusively within the account of democracy. It is not mentioned again until the discussion of the tyrannic man in Book Nine.

have discovered a kind of justice in their city, that is the issue to which Sokrates and the others turn.

With three of the four virtues now identified, it is justice that ought to be left over. Even so, they have to hunt for it as well by following its "tracks". As it turns out, "it's been rolling around at [their] feet from the beginning" (432d). It would seem that justice was established in the city when they set down the rule that "each one must practice one of the functions in the city, that one for which his nature made him naturally most fit" (433a). Justice is agreed to be the "practice of minding one's own business" that is implied by this rule. In contrast to moderation, the virtue of justice can be defined in terms of something that is truly common to all the individuals in the city. It is the product of the justness of each of the individuals in the city; that is, the city is just because each citizen within it minds his own business, and does his own work *well*; and as a result, the classes do not meddle in each other's affairs. Furthermore, Sokrates asserts that it plays a special role with regard to the other virtues: "it provided the power by which all these others came into being; and, once having come into being, it provides them with preservation as long as it's in the city" (433b). Thus, justice rivals the power of the other virtues in doing the city the most good.

Since justice has this special power in relation to the other virtues, it is appropriate here to consider more specifically how it brings moderation into being and preserves it. As moderation entails the agreement among the three classes of the city about which is to rule, justice provides the power by which it comes into being because it actually determines which people in the city are most fit to

rule by nature. In addition, it determines the tasks of all the other individuals. The result is that the work that needs doing in the city is done well, from the production of crops to the rule of the whole. Consequently, everyone ought to experience a basic level of satisfaction, and hence, be basically content with the ruling order of the polity. Indeed, insofar as each person performs the task to which he is best suited, most everyone is likely to be reasonably content not only with the basic arrangement of the regime but with their individual lives as well (since we get most satisfaction from doing things well). And insofar as in a just regime this accord about who is to rule has the consequence that the unruly passions, pleasures, and desires that are of particular concern in moderation are mastered by the ruling class (who have been educated so that they have complete civic virtue), the everyday "work" that moderation is to accomplish in the city is done well too. Thus, it would seem that the just city is the *most* moderate. In fact, when justice is present in the city, moderation is necessarily most present as well. However, the two do not appear to be equivalent, since without justice, political moderation may come into being in many forms (as noted above). In addition, justice adds something to moderation when it is present as well. For, there is likely to be a much greater sense of satisfaction throughout the city, resulting in a much more complete harmony. Thus, establishing justice is not merely one way, but the best way, for a city to be moderate.

Having successfully discovered justice in the city, Sokrates and his comrades can now consider whether it is the same in the human soul, and then finally judge its goodness for the individual. However, in order to use the justice of

the city as a model by which they can find justice in the soul, they need to establish a certain kind of similarity between the city and the soul. Since the virtues in the city were defined in terms of its three classes, it would seem that the soul must share a similar structure if it is going to be said to possess these virtues in the same way. The three classes in the city, however, arose out of three different kinds of political needs. First, there was the need for the provision of material things necessary for basic physical subsistence, as well as those other material luxuries that human beings naturally long for. The class of farmers and artisans was formed to attend to these needs. Second, there was a need to provide for the city's defence. Out of this need arose the class of warriors, who later became the "auxiliaries". Finally, Sokrates and Glaukon agreed that there was the need for an "overseer", for one who deliberates about the city as a whole. The class of "complete guardians" was formed to satisfy this third need. For each of these tasks they assigned the people best suited by nature to perform it. If there is to be a natural basis for an analogy between the city and the soul, these needs of the city must be reflective of those of an individual. And, this does seem to be the case; for the same affections (conditions or states; *pathē*; 435bc) that are in the city are in the individual as well. There is a need for providing for the body's basic material subsistence, for self-defence, and for deliberation.

The next question is whether the soul has three forms in it that correspond to the tasks that must be performed to answer to these needs, just as the city has three classes that attend to its three kinds of political needs. However, it seems to be a challenging task to determine whether or not the soul shares in the three



forms found in the city. Sokrates warns Glaukon that attaining a "precise grasp" of this question would require them to employ a much more involved and lengthy procedure than what they will undertake at this time. The account of the soul that follows, then, must be understood in terms of its usefulness for their present purposes. It is not said to be precise or complete. Doubts as to its adequacy arise again when Sokrates suggests that they employ a distinctly "psychological" version of the principle of contradiction in order to discern if the soul has parts: "It's plain that the same thing won't be willing at the same time to do or suffer opposites with respect to the same part and in relation to the same thing. So if we should ever find that happening in these things, we'll know they weren't the same but many" (436bc). After having given three illustrations of it (two of which arise out of possible objections), he explicitly leaves open the possibility that there may be other valid objections to it. Nevertheless, he and Glaukon decide to "assume that this is so and go ahead, agreed that if it should ever appear otherwise, all our conclusions based on it will be undone [loosened; *lelymenos*]" (437a).<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> As experience of oneself as a unity seems to be contrary to the notion that the soul has different parts that account for what seem to be qualitatively different experiences, the question of the adequacy of the principle of contradiction for investigating these matters is crucial. In the first place, one might question whether there *are* "opposites" in the soul. All of the examples Sokrates employs are *physical*, and it is not clear that they actually apply to the (presumably immaterial) soul. In addition, one might question how to determine what constitutes "opposites" in the human soul. For example, are acceptance and refusal, longing to take something and rejecting it, and embracing and thrusting away all clearly pairs of opposites in the human soul? Nietzsche raises these questions in the opening of *Beyond Good and Evil*. He asks whether there *are* opposites at all, and whether what philosophers have believed to be opposites are in fact such; he suggests that so-called "opposites" may even be "insidiously related" to one another ("Part One: On the Prejudice of Philosophers", aph. 2 in Walter Kaufmann's translation in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, p. 200). Finally, Sokrates himself casts further doubt upon the division of the soul into parts near to the close of the dialogue. In dis-



With this acknowledgement that their approach has potential limitations, Sokrates and Glaukon now return to the question of whether the soul has three forms in it that correspond to the tasks that must be performed to answer to the individual's needs, just as the city has three classes that attend to its three kinds of political needs. In this regard, Sokrates half asks and half asserts: "Isn't it quite necessary for us to agree that the very same forms and dispositions as are in the city are in each of us?...Surely they didn't get there from any other place" (435e). Thus, they agree that at least the three qualities in the city that are of particular concern to them—spiritedness, love of learning, and love of money—have their *origins* in the dispositions of the composing human beings.<sup>53</sup> However,

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cussing the immortality of the soul, he describes the difficulty in knowing the truth about the soul, using here the image of the statue of Glaukos, which had been deformed over time in many ways. Only if one could restore the soul to its "true nature" would it be possible to determine "whether it is many-formed or single-formed, or in what way and how" (612a). Nevertheless, a longer and fuller treatment of the human soul is undertaken in the books that follow this initial discussion (cf. 504b-d; 511e, 544d-e).

In addition, Bloom's translation is somewhat misleading on this point. While the word for "part", *meros*, is used almost four dozen times throughout the *Republic*, and it is used to refer to the three divisions in the city, it is not used even *once* in the discussion of whether the soul shares in the same three forms as are in the city. That is, the three "parts" of the soul are deciphered without ever using the word "part". Hence, the Greek does not have the same strong connotations that the soul is divided up into three discrete constituent elements. In order to get a sense of what difference this might make, one could read from 435a through to 442b, substituting a less definitive word like "thing" for "part"; or even better, instead of reading "the desiring part", "the spirited part", and "the calculating part", the most literal translation would be "the desiring", "the spirited", and "the calculating", respectively. However, insofar as it is useful to speak of the soul in terms of "parts" (especially in discussing moderation and justice, and in learning to rule one's own soul), I have continued to use this term throughout the discussion that follows. Sokrates himself eventually speaks of the "parts" of the soul in describing courage and wisdom in the soul (442c) as well as once when describing injustice (444b). After these three instances, however, the term is not used again until Book Five, where it once more describes the city (460c).

<sup>53</sup> This suggests, then, that each of the classes in the city may be defined by the form or disposition that is predominant in it. For example, spiritedness corresponds best to the auxiliaries (the quality of soul for which the warriors are selected), love of learning to the guardians (who are tested for the steadfastness of the convictions transmitted through the education), and love of money to the "producing" class. Thus, those who are

they have yet to show that the soul itself has parts, each of which is responsible for one of these three qualities. Nevertheless, through applying the principle of contradiction to the opposites felt in the soul, they manage to discern three corresponding parts. These three parts and the description of their differing natures will prove to be especially useful in understanding moderation in the soul and in comparing it to moderation in the city.

First they distinguish the calculating part of the soul from the "irrational and desiring part". Of their entire discussion of the soul, the treatment of desires occupies more than half of their attention. This seems appropriate since this part of the soul is later said to compose most of the soul (and is most insatiable for money; 442a), and its "size" would likely make it easy to recognise and familiar to all. As soon as Sokrates begins this discussion, however, he seems to make quite a significant mistake; for, he groups desiring together with willing. He suggests to Glaukon that "the soul of a [man] who desires either longs for what it desires or embraces that which it wants to become its own; or again, that, insofar as the soul wills that something be supplied to it, it nods assent to itself as though it had posed a question and reaches out towards the fulfilment of what it wills" (437c). However, even this description of desiring and willing reveals precisely what is different about them. Desiring is simply a longing for and embracing of its object, while "willing is more deliberate, and deliberative".<sup>54</sup> The rest of

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naturally suited to be in each class may be selected based upon the love that drives them, that is, based upon their principal motivation. Spiritedness, however, is the exception—the spirit's predominant love is not stated. Perhaps it is because it is marked by *two* distinctive loves: love of victory and love of honour (cf. 548c).

<sup>54</sup> Craig, p. 87. This brief discussion is based upon the much fuller explication given in Chapter Four: "Heart of Darkness".

Sokrates' analysis pertains only to desires, but this initial conflation suggests that often desiring and willing are equivalent for many people in practice.<sup>55</sup> Mediating this connection between desiring something and willing that the desire be fulfilled is one of the first steps towards becoming moderate—one must learn *not* to act immediately upon one's desires.

As the analysis of desires continues, Sokrates and Glaukon agree that "each particular desire itself is only for that particular thing itself of which it naturally is" (437e); that is, each desire is directed towards a single specific kind of object. For example, "the soul of the [man] who's thirsty, insofar as it thirsts, wishes nothing other than to drink, and strives for this and is impelled towards it" (439ab). This would seem to be true in the case of Eurylochos' hunger—his desire was for nothing other than food. Not all desires however, appear to have such narrowly definable objects. Sokrates' mention of "various sorts of knowl-

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<sup>55</sup> Thus Hobbes argues:

When in the mind of a man, Appetites, and Aversions, Hopes, and Feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an Appetite to it; sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to be able to do it; sometimes Despaire, or Feare to attempt it; the whole summe of Desires, Aversions, Hopes, and Feares, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION. ...

In deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of *Willing*. And Beasts that have *Deliberation*, must necessarily also have *Will*. The Definition of the *Will*, given commonly by the Schooles, that it is a *Rationall Appetite*, is not good. For if it were, then could there be no Voluntary Act against Reason. For a *Voluntary Act* is that, which proceedeth from the *will*, and no other. But if in stead of a *Rationall Appetite*, we shall say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then the Definition is the same that I have given here. *Will* therefore is the last Appetite in Deliberating. (*Leviathan*, "Chap. VI: Of the Interiour Beginnings of Voluntary Motions; commonly called the PASSIONS. And the Speeches by which they are expressed." in C.B. Macpherson's edition, pp. 127-8.)

edge" in the course of discussing the various ways in which things are related (438c) may cause one to wonder if the desire for knowledge of the human soul doesn't have an object that is comprehensive instead. This suggests that what Sokrates is actually describing throughout this section is a particular kind of desire—namely, that associated with the body, each of which is related to a kind of material object. In fact, at the outset of their attempt to discern three parts in the soul, Sokrates characterised one potential part as that which desires "the pleasures of nourishment and generation and all their kin" (436a). Desires such as thirst and hunger are said to be the "most vivid" representatives of this group (437d), and they do have this kind of specific "bodily" object that Sokrates has described. It would seem to be this kind of desire, "which is...by nature most insatiable for money", that is the first concern of one who would become moderate. *How* these desires, or more properly, this part of the soul, is mastered may be the most difficult problem in actually becoming moderate.

Using the principle of contradiction, all such desires can be plausibly grouped together and cast into a single part of the soul. And, through consideration of the fact that they are often resisted or denied outright, one suspects that there must be something else in the soul that opposes them. Sokrates and Glaukon quickly agree that there is a part of the soul that resists such desires through the use of calculation or deductive reason (*logismos*), and they name it the "calculating" part. They call that "with which [the soul] loves, hungers, thirsts and is agitated by the other desires, the irrational [*alogos*] and desiring, companion of certain replenishments and pleasures" (439d).

With these two parts distinguished, they now turn to consider spiritedness. First, they attempt to show that the spirit can be distinguished from the irrational and desiring part. Glaukon suspects that these two may be the same, but Sokrates offers him the story of Leontius and the corpses as an indication "that anger sometimes makes war against the desires as one thing against something else" (440a). As the spirit is the seat of anger, this would seem to suggest that it cannot be identified with the desiring part of the soul. Rather, Sokrates proposes that it is *naturally* allied to the calculating part (440b-d; 441a). He suggests to Glaukon, "But as for its making common cause with the desires to do what speech has declared must not be done, I suppose you'd say you had never noticed anything of the kind happening in yourself, nor, I suppose, in anyone else" (440b). Glaukon responds emphatically in the negative. Yet, this seems to be a crucial *question*. While Sokrates has not explicitly equated the spirit and the will, what we usually call the will does seem to be rooted in the spirit. For Sokrates speaks of the spirit as that power in the well-ordered soul that fulfils what the calculating part has deliberated upon and determined must be done (442b; cf. 440cd). If this is the case, then if the spirit is allied with the calculating part of the soul, it would entail that one's desires and one's will would *not* be allied by nature. Thus, one of the basic difficulties in becoming moderate—keeping separate one's desire for something and one's will that the desire be fulfilled—should not be a problem for most people, unless their spirits have been "corrupted by bad rearing" (441a). Moderation, then, would be especially easy to instil in good-natured children. If, however, the spirit is naturally allied with the



irrational and desiring part, then moderation is a problem right from one's earliest childhood. Without exploring this question further, Sokrates and Glaukon go on to consider whether the spirit can actually be distinguished from the calculating part of the soul. And, if it can, then they have established that the soul has three parts that correspond to the qualitatively distinct parts of the city. Nevertheless, this second stage in their determination that the spirit constitutes a separate part of the soul will provide us with another opportunity to give further consideration to this unanswered question.

Eager that they succeed, Glaukon offers some evidence that the spirited part and the rational part are distinct in that spiritedness can be present in young children without calculation; and Sokrates adds two more examples of his own, one involving the spiritedness of beasts and the other of Odysseus quelling his raging spirit with *logos* (441a-b). The first two examples indicate that the spirit can exist apart from the calculating part of the soul, and the third example, that of Odysseus, suggests that anger can be opposed by reason (i.e., *logos*) when the spirit and the calculating part do exist side by side. Thus, it does seem that the spirit is a distinguishable part of the soul. However, the first two examples cast doubt upon its "natural" alliance with the calculating part. Both in young children and in animals the spirit seems to be allied with the *desiring* part of the soul, contrary to Sokrates' claim that they "had never noticed anything of the kind happening...in anyone" (440b). In these cases, the spirit's energy is primarily in the service of precisely those desires connected with "nourishment and generation and all their kin" (436a). Furthermore, we have

seen that the spirit seems to have desires and passions of its own; for example, the desire for honour and revenge, and such passions as anger and indignation. Thus, it may be that these desires and passions of the spirit may *dominate* one's soul without it being subservient in an alliance with some other part. For example, when one takes a second look at the depiction of Odysseus, it is not at all clear that his "calculating part" is ruling in his soul. It is his *desire for revenge* that employs *logos* in putting down his anger temporarily, since he would have jeopardised his success by attacking them at that moment. Thus, while in the immediate sense *logos* is ruling the spirit, it seems that the ultimate "sovereign" of Odysseus' soul is his spirit. This would seem to cause further doubt as to the kind of natural alliance of the spirit with the calculating part that Sokrates proposes. Taken as a whole, this evidence suggests that the spirit may be allied with *either* of the two other parts of the soul, or that it may even be dominant itself. And yet, given the intensity of the spirit's own passions and its usefulness in ruling the bodily desires, the question of where the spirit is allied is paramount for moderation.

However, we are not left utterly without direction, for Sokrates' initial attempt to show Glaukon that the spirit is not allied to the desiring part of the soul, does indicate that there is a natural relationship between reason and the spirit. For example, it is true that we frequently get angry at ourselves for "giving in" to our desires, and for not being more "sensible"; whereas, we virtually never get angry at ourselves for following the dictates of our reason (though we may regret "miscalculations"). Moreover, the examples that follow the story of Leontius

and the corpses are particularly helpful for better understanding these matters. In the case when one has knowingly committed an injustice, "the nobler he is" the less capable of anger he'll be at suffering the appropriate punishment (which typically involves suffering some pain or deprivation). Alternatively, when one believes oneself to be the victim of injustice, his spirit in this case will "boil and become harsh and form an alliance for battle with what seems just" (440c). These examples suggest that the spirit is dependent upon one's reason to discriminate among situations; that is, the passions require the rational part to determine the general nature of the response. For example, that one ought to respond with calmness rather than indignation, or with grief rather than joy. The spirit's passionate expressions, then, do naturally rely upon one's reason to "recognise" the appropriate situations for each. Thus, educating one's mind affects one's emotional reactions, as was the purpose of the speech component of the musical education (e.g., the discussion of lamentation and of laughter). Therefore, there does seem to be some grounds for proposing a natural alliance between the spirited and calculating parts of the soul. However, there has also been ample evidence that it is not *necessarily* so. It seems prudent, then, to assume that the spirit would need to be properly trained if it is to be a useful and steadfast ally of reason (cf. 441ea; cf. 589b), one that may be employed in ruling the desires and pleasures that are of particular concern in acquiring moderation. Indeed, it was the purpose of the entire education in Books

Two and Three to instil both courage and moderation through the proper education of the spirit first of all.<sup>56</sup>

Having distinguished three parts in the soul that correspond to the three classes in the city in *logos*, Sokrates and Glaukon are finally in a position to apply their understanding of virtue in the city to the single person. This is the point at which the analogy between city and soul ought to come to fruition. Sokrates begins by taking up each of the virtues in the same order as they were discovered in the city. He asks, "Isn't it by now necessary that the private [man] be wise in the same way and because of the same thing as the city was wise? ... And, further, that a city be courageous because of the same thing and in the same way as a private [man] is courageous" (441c-d). Curiously, however, this parallel between the city and the man is not explicitly followed when they come to moderation. Instead, they skip over moderation and immediately move to a consideration of justice. That is, Sokrates does silently what he overtly threatened to do during the search for the virtues in the city. After briefly considering their discussion of justice in the soul, we will return to examine this peculiarity.

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<sup>56</sup> Many of these perplexities are resolved in *The War Lover* (cf. "Chapter 4: Heart of Darkness", especially). One of the central arguments is that the spirit itself is divided. For example, one part is marked by love of honour and another by love of victory. Craig shows that these are not given equal status. Throughout the *Republic*, love of victory is esteemed while love of honour is disparaged. He argues that it is the victory-loving part of the spirit that is naturally allied with reason. This suggests that this part of the spirit is especially useful in attaining moderation, while the honour-loving part may pose yet another obstacle. One might reconsider the example of the "high-spirited" Diomedes and his honour-loving companion Sthenelos in this light.

Justice is the first of the four virtues in the soul to receive a detailed treatment. This seems doubly appropriate, if, as was the case with justice in the city, it provided the means by which the others came into being. Armed with their tripartite understanding of the soul, they conclude that "the one within whom each of the parts minds its own business will be just and mind his own business" (441de). As a result, it is necessary to determine the proper business for each part of the soul according to its nature, just as they did for each person in the city. While these three parts of the soul had been distinguished from one another earlier, it is only here, in the account of justice in the soul, that the *correct* order of ruling is explicitly set down. Sokrates and Glaukon promptly agree that it is "proper for the calculating part to rule, since it is wise and has forethought about all of the soul, and for the spirited part to be obedient to it and its ally" (441e). This relationship between the calculating part and the spirited part is facilitated by the education, which, as we have already noted, toughens the intellect and makes the spirit tractable, "taming it by harmony and rhythm" (441ea). These two, then, are to rule the desiring part of the soul, taking care not to let it attempt to rule and subvert the rest. Thus, the principle underlying justice in the city—each one, one job, according to nature—seems to determine the order in the soul as well. That is, that part that is capable of deliberation—that "has forethought about all of the soul"—is the part best suited by nature to rule in the soul. And, as we observed earlier, it is this natural ruler in each of us with which we naturally identify our "selves".<sup>57</sup> Once this natural order of rule is de-

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<sup>57</sup> Note that in the city, the ruling order among the classes was determined at the end of



terminated, it is possible to go back and describe the other virtues. Perhaps this is part of the reason why Sokrates did not give a substantial treatment to wisdom and courage, focusing instead upon the analogy between the city and the man. These could not be treated more fully until the proper ruling order had been discovered; that is, until they had discovered justice. However, we must now examine why moderation was skipped over in this regard.

First, by not explicitly mentioning moderation, Sokrates raises the possibility that the analogy between the city and the soul does not hold in this case. As we saw in the search for moderation in the city, Sokrates does in fact reverse the analogy, drawing into question the extent of its usefulness for their investigation. The understanding of civic moderation was directly based upon understanding it in the individual. But it may be that moderation in the city and in the soul are somehow different. Second, skipping over moderation may also suggest that it does not depend upon the establishment of the correct ruling order among the parts of the soul in the same way as do wisdom and courage. In the discussion that follows, there is evidence that both of these possibilities are correct.

With the correct ruling order in the soul established, Sokrates goes back through the other three virtues, giving a brief summary of what each is in the soul. Last of all, he comes to moderation, suggesting that one is 'moderate be-

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Book Three, well before the city's justice was discovered. However, the same principle that they later discovered made the city just, also effectively determined its order of rule, despite its not being acknowledged as justice yet. Those best suited by nature to rule were selected as guardians. They are great-spirited men, educated in civic virtue, experienced warriors and older than the others (both of which makes them respected), and they are the best of them (i.e., they are prudent and powerful in guarding the city, caring for it as they care for themselves).

cause of the friendship and accord of these parts—when the ruling part and the two ruled parts are of the single opinion that the calculating part ought to rule and don't raise faction against it" (442cd). This understanding of moderation, however, would seem to make it practically equivalent to justice. For, already in his discussion with Thrasymachos, Sokrates had suggested that it is "justice that produces unanimity and friendship" (351d). And, Sokrates again emphasises their kinship when he comes to his summary of justice, after having briefly tested it "in the light of the vulgar standards" (442d-b):

And in truth justice was, as it seems, something of this sort; however, not with respect to a man's minding his external business, but with respect to what is within, with respect to what truly concerns him and his own. He doesn't let each part in him mind other people's business or the three classes in the soul meddle with each other, but really sets his own house in good order and rules himself; he arranges himself, becomes his own friend, and harmonises the three parts, exactly like three notes in a harmonic scale, lowest, highest and middle. And if there are some other parts in between, he binds them together and becomes entirely one from many, moderate and harmonised. (443c-e)

Thus, it would seem that justice itself accomplishes all that is involved in moderation. Indeed, it is likely that the *best* kind of moderation arises in a person who brings justice into his soul first; for, as the description of justice above showed, he is necessarily moderate as well. For, having placed the calculating part in the position of ruler, and having the spirit serve as its ally, the pleasures of drink, sex, and eating, and all their kin, as well as the passions and desires of the spirit are all mastered under the rule of reason. When ordered in this way, and with each part doing its work well, the soul is both moderate and harmonised. However, even in this case, the kind of accord concerning the question of which part is to

rule is not possible in the soul in the same way as it is in the city. For, as we noted in the city, all of its citizens are capable of deliberation on this issue, and they can all recognise both the benefits of the established arrangement and the harm that would be done under other arrangements. Each part of the soul, however, does not have this capability. As was discussed above, there are grounds for positing a natural alliance at least between the spirit and reason—there would seem to be an accord by nature as to the correct ruling relationship ("if it's not corrupted by bad rearing"). However, the third part of the soul is expressly said to be irrational (i.e., *alogos*). It is not capable of "agreeing", as are the farmers and artisans in the city. This is why Sokrates asserts that it is necessary for the other two parts to be "set over" it and for them to "watch it for fear" that it will upset the rest. Thus, the rule in the soul is more akin to that between master and slave rather than that between ruler and citizen. This third part of the soul is "in accord" over which ought to rule, but only by default—as long as it does not become "big and strong" as a result "of its being filled with the so-called pleasures of the body" (442a), it will be *unable* to challenge the established ruling order. Thus, moderation, even when it occurs as a result of the harmony produced by justice in the soul, is not identical to the moderation in the city. Perhaps this is part of the reason why Sokrates skips over it when mentioning wisdom and courage prior to his detailed treatment of justice. Moreover, none of this implies that moderation can *only* arise as the product of justice. It is still possible to distinguish these two virtues from one another; for, an individual may

become moderate without being truly just, much as in the same way a timocracy or oligarchy can be basically moderate.

To see the difference between moderation and justice, we must take a closer look at Sokrates' description of the moderate person. It is essential to note that Sokrates did not state that *moderation* is the "friendship and accord" that resulted when the three parts of the soul were of "the single opinion that the calculating part ought to rule". Rather, he was describing the person whose soul had *already* been arranged with the calculating part ruling, the spirited part as its ally, and the desiring part being ruled. Such a person, Sokrates suggested, is "*moderate*". It was Glaukon who generalised that description, saying that "*moderation*, surely...is nothing other than this, in city or in private [man]" (442d; cf. 432a). While Sokrates does not caution him about this generalisation, neither does he ratify it (cf. 430b-c; 434c-d). If we remain cautious about Glaukon's quick generalisation, then it seems that a person is moderate when there is a "friendship [*philia*] and accord [*symphōnia*]" in the soul concerning what rules in it. However, just as in the various regimes, there may be different ways that such unanimity in a soul may be established. For example, one might consider the oligarch described in Book Eight. He "puts the desiring and money-loving part on the throne...[and] makes the calculating and spirited parts sit by it on the ground on either side and be slaves, letting the one neither calculate about nor consider anything but where more money will come from less; and letting the other admire and honour nothing but wealth and the wealthy, while loving the enjoyment of no other honour than that resulting from the possession of money

and anything that happens to contribute to getting it" (553c-d). Such a man demonstrates a remarkable amount of self-mastery—he is "stingy and a toiler, satisfying only his necessary desires and not providing for other expenditures, but enslaving the other desires as vanities" (554a). And the more troublesome, and trouble-making desires, he forcibly holds down, "not by persuading them that they 'had better not' nor by taming them with argument, but by necessity and fear, doing so because he trembles for his whole substance" (554cd). Thus, he does appear to be basically moderate, and yet, he cannot be said to be just. For, in the first place, it is the money-loving part of his soul that rules, which as we have seen, is not its proper work (despite it having a tendency to attempt to do so; 442ab). Second, such a man's soul is not harmonious; he "wouldn't be free from faction within himself; nor would he be simply one, but rather in some sense twofold, although for the most part his better desires would master his worse desires" (554de). It is precisely such harmony that justice would provide; that is, with each part of the soul doing the work suitable to it *by nature*, it functions as a harmonious whole. When each part is assigned its own work, everything is done better, and when each part is properly reared and educated, this arrangement allows it to do its work *well*. This seems to be what justice adds to moderation in the soul. In contrast, a person may be outwardly moderate but lacking in this inner harmony, as is the case with the oligarch. And, because he's not truly just, his moderation is not "secure"—such a man's soul is not a model of "accord". His moderation is a perpetual struggle. Yet, since it is possible for such a person to be basically moderate without being truly just, perhaps this is a second reason



why Sokrates skips over moderation, mentioning only wisdom and courage before establishing the correct ruling order in the soul through his treatment of justice. That is, in the case of moderation, one can be basically moderate without having arranged his soul most correctly.

Thus, despite the very close association of justice and moderation throughout the *Republic*, the two virtues remain distinct. Justice, however, appears to be the comprehensive virtue. As in the city, the presence of complete justice in the soul necessarily makes one moderate in addition to just, and wise and courageous as well; that is, as prudent as one is capable of becoming, and fearing only what reason determines *should* be feared (cf. 442c). With this understanding of the human soul, and a clearer conception of both moderation and justice in it, we may take up Sokrates' subtle suggestion at the end of moderation in the city—we may compare this account of it in the soul with the more elaborate account in the city, thereby further refining our conception of moderation before drawing some final conclusions.

#### Chapter Four: Towards a Finer View of Moderation

As Sokrates concludes the hunt for the four virtues in the city, he cautions Glaukon from positively asserting what justice is before they have completed their investigation of it in the soul. If the two accounts agree with each other, then "everything is fine" (434b). But, if somehow something different should turn up in the soul, they shall return to the city and test it; and thus considering them "side by side and rubbing them together like sticks, we would make justice burst into flame, and once it's come to light, confirm it for ourselves" (434ea). Of course, such a comparison may be undertaken with any one of these four cardinal virtues. And, insofar as the accounts of the virtues in the city are all more elaborate than the accounts given in terms of the soul, it may be illuminating in any case to compare the two with one another, especially now that we have been provided with a basic understanding of the human soul. And, with regard to moderation, it may be especially fruitful, since the account of moderation in the city was based upon a tacit understanding of the human soul in order to decipher the seemingly paradoxical phrase "stronger than himself". Carrying through the suggested comparison, moreover, will provide a partial summary of the understanding of moderation developed to the end of Book Four. It will also provide an opportunity to note its limitations, which in effect serve to indicate some of the other portions of the *Republic* that are particularly relevant for a fuller examination of this virtue. Thus placing our examination of moderation in the context of the whole dialogue will allow for some concluding remarks.

To begin with, if we recall that Sokrates suggested that they skip over moderation in the city altogether, we now see how that might be plausible in terms of the soul as well. That is, if justice arises first, moderation necessarily follows, and in this way one might find moderation and justice at the same time. Furthermore, Sokrates' claim that it would be an "injustice" not to gratify Glaukon's desire to know what moderation is in the city, is more understandable now as well. Insofar as this particular desire to know arose in the calculating part of Glaukon's soul, its expression here indicates the proper ordering of his desires, at least for the moment. Gratifying such desires strengthens them and contributes to the permanent establishment of this order, thereby helping him to be more just. That *Sokrates* might be acting unjustly were he not to assist Glaukon in this regard suggests that justice may require doing good to one's friends, as Polemarchos originally suspected (332a).

Next, Sokrates suggested that moderation in the city was "more like a kind of accord and harmony" than were wisdom and courage. This is true in the soul as well—the accord among the parts of the soul about which is to rule also produces a certain degree of harmony. However, it is justice that completes and solidifies such harmony. The soul only becomes truly harmonious once justice is introduced into it; that is, once each part is doing the work suitable to it by nature. In contrast, moderation may exist along side a certain amount of potential faction. As we saw in the case of the oligarch, his better desires master his worse for the most part, and he compels both his reason and his spirit to serve

those better desires; but, there is still a faction in his soul—he is no longer simple and one.

This view of moderation as an accord and harmony also changes the emphasis away from the perpetual conflict that seemed to accompany the account of moderation in Book Three. Moderation for the multitude entailed rule of the pleasures connected with the body and of the passions and desires of the spirit. This required the ability to restrain oneself from engaging in certain activities whereby such pleasures, passions, and desires are indulged, which in turn was seen to be essential in being able to obey rulers as well. This emphasis upon restraint and being ruled did not suggest that a harmony was the product. Instead, the examples focused upon the struggles between ruler and subject, both in the city and in the soul. The example of Agamemnon, Diomedes, and Sthenelos showed the conflict between ruler and ruled, and the portion of the *Odyssey* that Sokrates quotes of Odysseus' struggle to restrain his anger emphasised the intensity of the passions that must be subdued. The one story that might have suggested such harmony—Odysseus' statement that the finest of all things was a people united together at a public festival—was used as an example of what must be expunged. Moderation for the multitude, then, suggested that self-mastery is a perpetual struggle. The account of moderation presented in Book Four, however, suggests that day-to-day moderation may arise more naturally from having solidly established an agreed upon order of rule. This is not to say that all of one's bad desires and troublesome passions and pleasures simply disappear. Rather, Sokrates and Glaukon agree that the irra-

tional and desiring part of the soul must be continually watched "for fear of its being filled with the so-called pleasures of the body and thus becoming big and strong", with the result that it might attempt to enslave and rule the rest of the soul (442ab). Indeed, Sokrates later asserts that "some terrible, savage, and lawless form of desires is in every [man], even in some of us who seem to be ever so measured [moderate; *metrios*] (572b). Hence, the problematic desires and passions may never be entirely eradicated; but, with training and practise, the soul will be obedient and follow its ruler when such struggles arise. This is revealed in a portion of the episode with Odysseus that Sokrates does *not* quote; for, despite his anger having been deeply stirred, his "heart in great obedience endured and stood it without complaint" (*Odyssey*, XX, 23-24). Thus, the conception of moderation given in Book Four provides a further response to Adeimantos' explicit attack on moderation. While *acquiring* moderation may be "hard and full of drudgery", it is not necessary that it be perpetually so. However, it is unlikely that most people will attain as fully as they could the inner accord that brings a more peaceful kind of moderation. It remains the case that for the multitude, moderation will only be maintained through forcibly putting down one's desires as they arise, in the knowledge that there is a police that will forcibly put them down otherwise.<sup>58</sup> Thus, there are at least these two ranks of mod-

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<sup>58</sup> Hence, one suspects there will always be a need for various forms of "security personnel" at drinking and dancing establishments, "rock and roll" concerts, and professional sporting events, for example; and, that one must always be prepared to prosecute shoplifters.



eration: one that is forced, and another that is more voluntary, more peaceful (cf. 399a-c).

The tripartite conception of the soul also helps to illuminate Sokrates' preliminary description of moderation in the city as "a certain kind of order and mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires". In the individual, the ordering of one's pleasures and desires follows the ordering of the parts of one's soul. For example, if the pleasures that come through the body and the corresponding desires dominate, they will enslave the rest of the soul and make the other pleasures and desires subservient to them. This is true of the oligarch described in Book Eight. His stingy, money-making desires order and master all the rest, including the more spendthrift ones of his irrational and desiring part (553c-d). However, a more complete account of moderation would entail an examination of the characteristic pleasures and desires in *each* part of the soul, in order to determine what sort of threat they pose (if any) to moderation (i.e., self-rule), and how they are to be ordered and mastered. As we suspected earlier, the account of the desires given in Book Four applies best to those associated with the body. In addition, we have seen that the spirit has certain passions and desires of its own; and, the calculating part, too, has its own desires and pleasures. In fact, the latter were noted at the outset of the dialogue by Kephalos, when he mentioned the "desires and pleasures that have to do with speeches" (328d). Furthermore, each part takes enjoyment in its own pleasures (580d-583a). In order to explicate the *kinds* of pleasures and desires that must be ordered and mastered if one is to be fully moderate, it would be necessary as well

to discuss in substantial terms the division of both pleasures and desires into necessary ones and unnecessary ones (cf. 558d-c; 561a). Moreover, Sokrates gives a still finer treatment of desires, dividing the necessary ones into those that "we aren't able to turn aside justly" and those "whose satisfaction benefits us" (558de), and dividing the unnecessary ones into those that are hostile to law and those that are not (571b; cf. 554bc). Such a division and categorisation of desires can be undertaken with regard to each part of the soul, and doubtless would reveal much more about how they ought to be ordered. In addition, Sokrates also provides more details about *how* the various kinds of pleasures and desires may be mastered. For example, pleasures may be ruled by practising and honouring the ones "belonging to fine and good desires" and checking and enslaving those that belong to "bad desires" (561bc). In turn, the worse desires may be ruled through force by the better desires combined with prudence (431c; cf. 554a, cd, 571b, 442e-a), or by charming them with music (411ab; 441ea), or by persuasion, or by "taming them with argument", or by "necessity and fear" (554d), or by shame (560a, 571c, 573b). Coming to a complete understanding of what Sokrates means when he says moderation "is surely a certain kind of order and mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires" would involve a thorough discussion of all these portions of the dialogue in conjunction with the continual refinements in the basic psychology first presented in Book Four.

That so-called track on the hunt for moderation—the phrase "stronger than himself"—is now more easily explained in terms of the three parts of the

soul as well. First of all, this phrase no longer seems as 'ridiculous' as it might have at first, for there are clearly different aspects or facets of the soul that are being referred to. In addition, Sokrates' account of the soul made it clear that the soul does have better facets and worse. And, the calculating part is elevated to the ruling position, "since it is wise and has forethought about all of the soul" (441e). In fact, it is this part that performs such calculations about what is better and what is worse (441c). In contrast, the irrational and so-called "desiring" part is clearly demoted and it must continually be watched so that it does not ruin one's entire life (442ab). Furthermore, since this phrase is used "when that which is by nature better is master over that which is worse" (431a), we can now understand what Sokrates called attention to: that it implies *praise*. Our natural identification with the rational part of our souls suggests that this phrase, "stronger than himself" applies best when that part rules. This is likely another reason why Sokrates emphasises the rule of the calculating part when he describes why a single man is "moderate"; whereas, in moderation in the city he only suggests rule by that which is better *by nature*. While every human being has a rational part to his soul, regardless of the extent to which it is developed, the best part in a particular kind of regime may vary more widely. For example, that class of "timocrats" described in Book Eight, that honours its rulers and the "stratagems of war", preserving at least a few qualities of the aristocracy are no longer present in an oligarchy. Rather, such men turn more completely towards money-making, "and the more honourable they consider it, the less honourable they consider virtue" (550e). As a result, "instead of men who love victory and

honour, they finally become lovers of money-making and money; and they praise and admire the wealthy man and bring him to the ruling offices, while they dishonour the poor man" (551a). In an oligarchy, then, the more virtuous class of timocrats is not present to be considered for the task of ruling. Thus, a regime may be said to be moderate when whichever part that happens to be best in it rules, and the rest is in accord.

As Sokrates continues the search for moderation in the city, he suggests that "the simple and moderate desires, pleasures and pains, those led by calculation accompanied by intelligence and right opinion" are to master "the desires in the common many" (431c-d). If we apply this to the individual soul, it would suggest that these simple and moderate (or measured; *metrios*) desires, pleasures, and pains are those that respond to the leadership of the rational part of the soul. That would be those of the calculating part itself, as well as any others that are allied to it (naturally or through proper training) or which are approved by it (as some pleasures of the body are). In particular, some of the spirit's passions and pleasures would be included, and these would help to master the worse desires, both in the spirit and in the altogether irrational (*alogos*) part of the soul.

Furthermore, the problem of how to master the desires is partly addressed here as well. Sokrates' description of moderation in the city suggests that some desires in the soul may be mastered by others. As Sokrates describes later, "when someone's desires incline strongly to some one thing, they are therefore weaker with respect to the rest, like a stream that has been channelled off in

that other direction" (485d). Left to themselves, however, the desires would seem to order themselves according to their moment-by-moment intensity. However, moderation entails that the "simple and measured" ones rule over the rest. As Sokrates suggests, this kind of ordering is accomplished through "calculation accompanied by intelligence and right opinion" (431c). Thus, reason helps to order the desires, allowing certain ones to be pursued, thereby making them stronger than those that are held to be inferior. The development of the rational part of the soul is thus required to determine both the proper order of the desires and the proper measure of each. This leads to a much closer analysis of the alternate word for moderation, *metrios*, especially as it is developed throughout Books Five, Six, and Seven. For the rational part of the soul must determine the *natural* standard by which all things may be measured (504c), and this entails that one engage in philosophy.<sup>59</sup> Thus, one is led to suspect that of those two inscriptions on the temple of Apollo at Delphi, abiding by the one, "Nothing in Excess", entails the pursuit of the other as well, "Know Thyself".<sup>60</sup>

<sup>59</sup> It seems as if Nietzsche is well-aware of this relationship:

MEASURE AND MODERATION.—Of two quite lofty things, measure and moderation, it is best never to speak. A few know their force and significance, from the mysterious paths of inner experiences and conversions; they honour in them something quite godlike, and are afraid to speak aloud. All the rest hardly listen when they are spoken about, and think the subjects under discussion are tedium and mediocrity. We must perhaps except those who have once heard a warning note from that realm but have stopped their ears against the sound. The recollection of it makes them angry and exasperated. ("Miscellaneous Maxims and Opinions", aph. 230 in Paul V. Cohn's translation in *Human, All Too Human*, p.125.)

<sup>60</sup> Again, Nietzsche seems to demonstrate his appreciation of this:

*Moderation.* Complete decisiveness in thought and inquiry—that is, free-thinking, when it has become a quality of character—makes men moderate in behaviour: for it reduces covetousness, draws much of the available energy to itself in



However, as we saw before, the discussion of moderation in the city to this point only constitutes a "track" on the way to a definition of moderation. It is finally defined as a unanimity, "an accord of worse and better, according to nature, as to which must rule in the city and in each one" (432a). While we discussed how such unanimity is attained in the city in *logos*, and in political life generally, it was more difficult to understand how moderation in the soul could be characterised as a unanimity of its parts; that is, how the other two parts of the soul, and the irrational part in particular, could hold "the same opinion about who should rule". Understanding how this accord among the parts is produced in the soul is crucial for a complete account of moderation. Certainly, it would involve the satisfaction of the desires for some pleasures, especially those necessary ones that cannot be justly turned aside. For example, one must turn to the fuller account of the desires and pleasures of the various parts of the soul and examine how these are best satisfied (cf. 586d-e with 579de). In addition, one must consider how the whole soul can "know" a certain ruling arrangement to be best (cf. 442cd with 401d).

As is readily seen from this comparison of moderation in the soul and moderation in the city, our examination of this virtue is necessarily incomplete. However, this comparison has allowed us to specify some crucial issues that remain unresolved and to indicate where one must turn to pursue a fuller account. Hence, our examination of moderation through Book Four of the *Republic*

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order to advance spiritual ends, and shows what is half-useful or useless and dangerous about all sudden changes. (*Human, All Too Human*, "Section Eight: A Look at the State", aphorism 464 in M. Faber's and S. Lehmann's translation, p. 221.)

is useful in a number of ways. To begin with, we have seen how moderation is a problem that permeates political life, as is demonstrated in the dramatic action of the *Republic* itself. Glaukon and Adeimantos, each in his own way, indicates why it is naturally unappealing. Second, we have seen why the education given in Books Two and Three focuses upon instilling *both* moderation and courage, as both of these virtues are required if great-spirited youths are to exercise a rigorous self-discipline. Moreover, moderation is essential for making the courage of the young warriors of the city *useful* to its rulers. Third, we have seen why it is tied to the problem of justice, and why the treatment of these two virtues in the dialogue often fails to make a clear distinction between them—indeed, it seems sometimes purposefully to confuse them. We have been able, nonetheless, to separate these virtues and suggest how moderation may come into existence without the presence of perfect justice, and what justice adds to a moderate city or to a moderate soul when it does come into being. Most importantly, however, our understanding of what is involved in becoming moderate has been substantially broadened.

The obvious emphasis upon the desires and pleasures connected to the body have turned out to be only a part of the problem in becoming moderate. This examination has shown that the human spirit poses at least as much of a problem as the irrational and so-called "desiring" part of the soul does. There seems to be two issues here in particular. First, it is clear that the spirit has passions and desires of its own that must be controlled if one is to become moderate. The analysis of the examples of moderation for the multitude alerted us to

such problems as anger, status, pride, lust, love, and revenge. The self-mastery required in moderation, then, involves far more than rule over one's various concerns for the body. Second, we have found that the spirit may also be a useful ally in acquiring moderation. Insofar as it is allied with the rational part of the soul, it helps to accomplish what the rational part determines. Thus, it may be especially useful in ruling the pleasures connected to the body, and even the lower passions and pleasures of the spirit itself. When one considers that the spirit is at once a problem for moderation and a solution to it, one suspects that learning to rule one's spirit is perhaps the single greatest issue in one's own efforts at acquiring this virtue. Understanding this apparent tension, perhaps even division, in the spirit is necessary for a full account of moderation.<sup>61</sup>

However, in addition to its incompleteness, this examination of moderation must also remain provisional. As we noted in the case of courage, Sokrates cautions Glaukon by telling him to accept their treatment of it to that point as "political courage". The same must be said of our treatment of moderation. Sokrates explicitly tells Adeimantos that a "still finer treatment" is possible for all the virtues:

"So these aren't the greatest," he said, "but there is something yet greater than justice and the other things we went through?"

"There is both something greater," I said, "and also even for these very virtues it won't do to look at a *sketch*, as we did a while ago, but their most perfect elaboration must not be stinted." (504de)

This "most perfect elaboration" involves the study of the "*idea* of the good". Sokrates asserts that 'it's by availing oneself of it along with just things and the

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<sup>61</sup> A further exploration of the spirit would require the recognition of the difference be-

rest that they become useful and beneficial" (505a). These remarks provide the foundation for the establishment of the five-part pre-philosophic education outlined in Book Seven, which prepares those who are suitable for the study of dialectic (531d; 534e).<sup>62</sup> Hence, a complete account of moderation, as well as of the rest of the virtues, requires a careful analysis of these central books. And, when we consider the distribution of those other portions of the dialogue that also require close analysis, it becomes clear that a truly complete account of moderation is coterminous with a comprehensive interpretation of the *Republic* as a whole. Indeed, as we noted at the outset, the very drama of the dialogue is itself an example of moderation—replacing food, drink, and an all-night festival with a night of speeches—a banquet for the soul. This conclusion, however, is as it should be. For the principles of interpretation outlined in the preface were founded upon the assumption that each Platonic dialogue constitutes a perfect whole, with each and every element contributing to that whole. As a result, a complete account of moderation ought to involve one in a treatment and ex-

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tween the love of victory and the love of honour (e.g., 548c; 581b).

<sup>62</sup> Thus, Nietzsche observes: "Even the most sublime ethical deeds...and that calm sea of the soul, so difficult to attain, which the Apollinian Greek call *sôphrosynê*, were derived from the dialectic of knowledge by Sokrates and his like-minded successors, down to the present, and accordingly designated as teachable." (*Birth of Tragedy*, Section 15, in Walter Kaufmann's translation in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, p. 97.)

planation of the entire dialogue. Consequently, the examination of moderation attempted here stands as a prolegomenon to that greater task.



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